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ESSAY
OLD CHIEFv. UNITED STATES: STIPULATING AWAY
PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY?
Daniel C. Richman*
INTRODUCTION

ARLIER this year, in Old Chief v. United States,' the Supreme Court finally resolved a circuit split on a nagging
I
evidentiary issue: When a defendant charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm2 offers to satisfy one of
the statute's elements by stipulating to the existence of a prior
felony conviction, may the government decline the stipulation
and prove the existence and the nature of that prior felony?3
*Visiting Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law; Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Dan Capra, Anne Coughlin,
Jill Fisch, Richard Friedman, Nick Johnson, Pam Karlan, Nathan and Louise Katz,
Larry Kramer, Jerry Lynch, Mike Martin, Bill Stuntz, Ben Zipursky, and participants
in the University of Virginia Legal Studies Workshop for helpful comments, and to
Fordham Law School for a grant in support of this project.
1 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
2Section 922(g) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... (1) who has been convicted in any court
of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year... to
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994). Violations of this provision are punishable by fine or by
imprisonment for up to ten years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)-(b) (1994); see also 18
U.S.C. § 3665 (1994) (providing for confiscation of firearms possessed by felons).
3Before the Court's decision, a majority of circuits had already barred the government from proving the nature of a defendant's prior felony where he offered to
stipulate to the existence of a prior felony, or had at least suggested that admission of
such evidence would generally be considered an abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994) (en banc); United States v. Gilliam, 994
F.2d 97, 102-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 927 (1993); United States v. Rhodes,
32 F.3d 867, 870-71 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1130 (1995); United States
v. Poore, 594 F.2d 39, 40-43 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Palmer, 37 F.3d 1080,
1084-85 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1804 (1995); United States v. Wacker,
72 F.3d 1453, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. O'Shea, 724 F.2d 1514, 1516
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The question of evidence law resolved in Old Chiefis not particularly earth-shattering. Indeed, while the Court divided five

to four on the issue, neither Justice Souter's opinion for the
Court nor Justice O'Connor's dissent ventured beyond a relatively narrow doctrinal analysis. Evidence as to the nature of a
defendant's prior felony conviction is indeed relevant, the Court
reasoned, but the risk of unfair prejudice it presents far outweighs the probative value, once the defendant's proffered con-

cession is considered as an alternative.5 Therefore, where a
§ 922(g)(1) defendant is willing to admit having a prior felony
conviction, the government may not prove what that conviction
was for." Save for its categorical approach to what generally is a
fact-sensitive matter, the decision is of a piece with so many judicial applications of Federal Rule of Evidence 403' (or its state
analogues), which, for fear of jury misuse, bar compelling proof
on issues not seriously in dispute.
(11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320, 322-24 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Three
circuits found the government not obliged to accept such a stipulation. See United
States v. Hudson, 53 F.3d 744, 747 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Burkhart, 545
F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Flenoid, 718 F.2d 867, 868 (8th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690-92 (9th Cir. 1993). The Seventh Circuit
told trial judges to resolve the issue case by case, see United States v. Lomeli, 76 F.3d
146, 150-51 (7th Cir. 1996), and the Third Circuit had found no need to resolve the
issue, see United States v. Jacobs, 44 F.3d 1219, 1224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1835 (1995).
No court permitted the government to prove up the conduct underlying the prior
felony conviction.
4 For a discussion of Justice Souter's brief venture beyond this narrow context, see
infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
5There remains some dispute about whether, when a defendant stipulates to a prior
felony, the jury should be instructed to treat that element as proven. Compare
United States v. Mason, 85 F.3d 471 (10th Cir. 1996) (no error for trial court to
instruct jury that prior felony and commerce elements of statute have been satisfied
where defendant stipulates to the facts establishing those elements) with United
States v. Jones, 65 F.3d 520,522 (6th Cir.) (such an instruction is erroneous because a
trial judge may not "override or interfere with the jurors' independent judgment")
(citation omitted), vacated, 73 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 1995), conviction aff'd, 108 F.3d 668
(6th Cir. 1997) (finding no need to decide whether instruction was erroneous because
defendant did not object, suffered no prejudice, and error not plain).
6
See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 647.
7 Fed. R. Evid. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
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Within the frame of the single case, Old Chief is simply an effort to remove a factor that Congress found of little moment
when it cast § 922(g)(1)'s broad prohibition. Perhaps it is a futile effort, though. The rule announced does not prevent juries
from considering the nature of a defendant's felony. It merely
deprives them of accurate information about it.' The juror who
gives any thought to the nature of a defendant's underlying felony can only speculate-speculation that will likely be guided
by stereotypes of race, gender and class, and that will simply be
driven underground by instructions that she not consider the defendant's prior record. Whether defendants will have the option of correcting misimpressions in this regard is a question
troublingly left open by the Court's decision.
The questions raised by Old Chief, however, go far beyond
the confines of evidence doctrine, and go to the relationship between evidentiary rules, prosecutorial discretion, and prosecutorial accountability. If citizens have any voice in the fine-grained
decisions that prosecutors make about resource allocations, they
have it not because of appointive or electoral politics but because
prosecutors make charging-and plea bargaining-decisions in
the shadow of jury verdicts, or at least projected verdicts. Yet
such decisions are also made in the shadow of exclusionary evidentiary rules that often deprive jurors of the very information
that they, as citizens, would find most relevant to prosecutorial
priorities. Old Chief effectively creates just such a rule, based,
as most evidentiary rules are, on considerations of fairness in
the individual case. Are those considerations outweighed by the
rule's systemic costs? If the Court is successful in bleaching out
the difference in § 922(g)(1) trials between the convicted murderer and the defendant with a less troubling record, will that
make prosecutors neutral between such cases when deciding
whether to bring charges? If one assumes, as many have, that
prosecutors simply seek to maximize convictions, the answer is
"yes." Indeed, if this assumption is true and if jurors' readiness
to convict is driven by speculation about a defendant's record,
then Old Chief threatens a world in which even race-neutral
8See Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative
Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 1011 (1978).
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prosecutors select cases based on the worst sort of stereotypes.
Should the rule be applied symmetrically, preventing defendants from correcting juror misimpressions, it will be even more
pernicious. In a world where prosecutors primarily sought to
maximize convictions, the systemic costs of this, and many other,
exclusionary rules of evidence would therefore be considerable.

But do prosecutors really work this way? And if they are not
trying to maximize convictions (or sentence-years), what are
they trying to do? This Essay does not come close to answering

this critical, but surprisingly under-studied question.

By in-

quiring into the interaction between evidentiary rules, jury verdicts, and prosecutorial choices, however, it seeks to offer a

richer account than has hitherto been provided of the significance of evidentiary rules in a criminal justice system in which
trials almost never happen.9 It also challenges us to move forward beyond simplistic assumptions about prosecutorial motivation-assumptions that are not merely unhelpful but deter us
from understanding how our system really works (or doesn't).
I. THE RULE IN OLD

CHIEF

A. The Defendant'sDilemma

Notwithstanding the broad availability and legality of firearms
in the United States, the felon-in-possession statute"0 sweeps
9During fiscal year 1995, of the 47,868 defendants who were either acquitted or
convicted in federal district court (i.e., whose cases were not dismissed), 43,103 (90%)
were convicted upon pleas of either guilty or nolo contendere. Bureau of Justice
Statistics Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1995, at 478 tbl.5.29 (Kathleen
Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996) [hereinafter Sourcebook]. In 300 representative counties, 92% of convictions were upon guilty pleas. Id. at 498 tbl.5.47.
1018 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). A precursor to this provision was enacted in the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)).
See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980) ("The statutory language [of
§ 1202(1)] is sweeping, and its plain meaning is that the fact of a felony conviction
imposes a firearm disability until the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of
his disability by some affirmative action .... ."). The current version of § 922(g) was a
part of the Firearms Owners Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449
(1986).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (1994), a predicate felon otherwise barred from possessing a weapon under § 922(g) may apply to the Treasury Department for relief,
and the Secretary or his designate may grant such relief "if it is established to his
satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the conviction, and the applicant's
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broadly: Anyone previously convicted of a felony, whether state
or federal, can be prosecuted in federal court merely for possessing a firearm, and imprisoned for up to ten years. The government needs to show only: (1) that the defendant previously
was convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year;11 (2) that the defendant knowingly possessed,

transported, shipped, or received the firearm; and (3) that the
possession was in or affecting commerce." No showing that a
record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner
dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to
the public interest." In the 1993 Appropriations Act for the Treasury Department,
however, Congress specifically barred any funding for the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms "to investigate or act upon applications for relief' under this
provision, Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act,
1993, Pub. L. No. 102-393,106 Stat. 1729 (1992), and such a limitation was imposed in
the next two Appropriation Acts as well, Pub. L. 103-123, 107 Stat. 1226 (1993); Pub.
L. 103-329, 108 Stat. 2382 (1994). The circuits have split on whether these provisions
effectively repealed the relief provision. Compare United States v. McGill, 74 F.3d
64,67 (5th Cir. 1996) (yes), and Moyer v. Secretary of the Treasury, 830 F. Supp. 51618 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (yes), with Rice v. ATF, 68 F.3d 702,707 (3d Cir. 1995) (no).
" Under § 921(a)(20) (1994), the term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year" does not include:
(A) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair
trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices, or
(B) any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor
and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.
What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any
conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has
been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a
conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or
restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship,
transport, possess, or receive firearms.
Although § 922(g)(1) defines its predicate crimes by length of possible imprisonment
and not by class, I will follow judicial convention and call these crimes "felonies."
t2 United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ramos,
961 F.2d 1003, 1005 (1st Cir. 1992), overruled on unrelated grounds by United States
v. Caron, 77 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. McNeal, 900 F.2d 119, 121 (7th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Shunk, 881 F.2d 917, 921 (10th Cir. 1989).
Section 922(g)(1) has survived numerous Commerce Clause challenges brought in
the wake of United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). See, e.g., United States
v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294,
296 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 498 (7th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d
1456, 1462 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400 (10th Cir.
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defendant specifically knew of his felony status or the interstate
nexus appears to be necessary.13
Since the government generally can prove a defendant's felony status with uncontrovertible documentary proof, and show
a weapon's interstate connection with unassailable expert testimony, 4 the chief, perhaps only, factual issue that the parties will
seriously dispute in front of a jury will be possession. Yet even
though a defendant's felony status is analytically separate from
the other issues in the case, the chances that jurors aware of his
criminal record (if they deem it serious) will be overly quick to
find possession and convict are all too great.'5
The route that a juror takes once exposed to such evidence
can vary. She might infer that the defendant has a bad character, and from that, assume he would be more likely to possess a
gun illegally. 6 She might consciously or subconsciously demand
less of the government, secure that she will have few regrets if a
convicted felon is sent "back" to prison, irrespective of his guilt
on the pending charge." Or she might not even tarry on the
question of factual guilt, and will vote to convict someone she
thinks was not punished enough the first time and/or who may
1995); Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 674, 717-19 & n.183

(1995).
3See

Langley, 62 F.3d at 606; United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81-82 (5th Cir.

1988).
4

'1 See, e.g., Rawls, 85 F.3d at 243; United States v. Ware, 914 F.2d 997, 1001-03 (7th
Cir. 1990) (ATF agent helpful in determining whether firearm had traveled interstate); United States v. Wallace, 889 F.2d 580, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1989) (ATF agent
properly permitted to opine that markings on gun established it had been manufactured by out-of-state company); United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 724-25 (9th Cir.

1984).
IsSee Deborah S. Prutzman, Note, Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of
1968,76 Colum. L. Rev. 326,345 (1976).
,6See Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence,
18 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 59, 68-69 (1984).
17

See Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1021 (1977):

[S]ome may regard a convicted felon as essentially criminal and believe that if
he did not commit the crime charged he probably has committed or will commit
other crimes. For these reasons the mistaken conviction of those with criminal
records is likely to be perceived as less regrettable than the mistaken conviction
of individuals thought never to have been in trouble with the law.
Id. at 1039; Harry Kalven & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 179 (1966) (if judge
admits evidence of an accused's other crimes, jury will likely use a "different ... calculus of probabilities" in deciding whether to convict).
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pose a threat to her community. Whichever route is taken,
there is much power to the conventional wisdom that "inquiry"
into a defendant's prior crimes will "weigh too much with the
jury and...-so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad
general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend
against a particular charge."'". This, of course, is the basis for
Rule 404, which bars the use of "[e]vidence of other crimes...
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith."' 9
One solution to the problem would be flatly to bar the government from proving that the defendant in a felon-in-possession
case has a criminal record. But courts have uniformly rejected
this approach, and rightfully so. Not even the broadest reading
of Rule 403-which generally addresses risks of unfair prejudice-can prevent the prosecution from satisfying its burden of
proving an element of the charged offense. Nor have defendants been permitted to separate the felony and possession elements by completely stipulating the felony element out of the
case, or by bifurcating the proceeding, because a defendant's
status as a felon remains an integral element of the crime. Here,
courts have reasoned, the risk to the government could be described in much the same terms as the risks that a defendant
faces when the jury learns of his prior felony.
As the First Circuit explained, in overturning a trial court's
plan to bifurcate a felon-in-possession trial:
[W]hen a jury is neither read the statute setting forth the crime
nor told of all the elements of the crime, it may, justifiably,
question whether what the accused did was a crime .... Possession of a firearm by most people is not a crime. A juror who
owns or has friends and relatives who own firearms may wonSMichelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948).
"Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 4.11, at 216-20 (1995); 1 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael A. Martin & Daniel
J. Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 317-19 (6th ed. 1994).
Congress recently relaxed the Federal Rules of Evidence's general prohibition on
the use of prior crimes evidence on a propensity theory. See Fed. R. Evid. 413, 414.
For perspectives on the wisdom of this change, see the symposiums in the Fordham
Urban Law Journal, 22 Ford. Urb. L.J. 265-359 (1995), and the Chicago-Kent Law
Review, Symposium on the Admission of Prior Offense Evidence in Sexual Assault
Cases, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 3 (1994).
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der why [the defendant's] possession was illegal. Doubt as to
the criminality of [the defendant's] conduct may influence the
jury when it considers the possession element.'

Given that nearly half of all American households have at
least one firearm,'

and that, with certain noteworthy excep-

tions,' federal and state regulations generally pose little obstacle
to the possession of such weapons, the government would indeed be handicapped, perhaps fatally, were a jury to perceive a

case as a criminal prosecution for mere possession of a firearm.'
Here, too, a juror's route might vary. She might take the judge's
word that mere possession is criminal, but, having never heard
of such an offense herself, be inclined to cut some slack for the
defendant whose only crime was to carry a gun. 4 She might be2OUnited States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1989). See also United
States v. Jacobs, 44 F.3d 1219, 1222-23 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d
957, 959 (9th Cir. 1993), modified, 20 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Birdsong, 982 F.2d 481,482 (11th Cir. 1993).
Courts have cited similar reasons when rejecting defense efforts to stipulate the
felony element entirely out of § 922(g)(1) prosecutions. See United States v. Gilliam,
994 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 927 (1993); United States v. Bruton,
647 F.2d 818, 825 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 868 (1981); United
States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 740 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980);
United States v. Blackburn, 592 F.2d 300, 301 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003,1006 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978).
21See James D. Wright, Peter H. Rossi & Kathleen Daly, Under The Gun: Weapons,
Crime and Violence in America 34-35 (1983). If the question is presented as one of
individual ownership, the results are consistent. See David Hemenway, Sara Solnick
& Deborah Azrael, Firearms and Community Feelings of Safety, 86 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 121, 122 (1995) ("[G]un owners comprise almost 30% of U.S. population."); see also Sourcebook, supra note 9, at 189 tbls.2.78, 2.79 (35% of poll respondents in 1995 say they "personally own a gun," 41% of respondents in 1994 report
having a firearm in home).
2 See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. §§ 6-2311 to -2312 (1995); N.Y. Penal Law § 265.02
(McKinney 1989) (felony to possess any loaded gun) and § 400.00 (McKinney Supp.
1996) (no license issued if good cause exists for denial); see also Sourcebook, supra
note 9, at 120 tbl.1.110 (surveying state statutory provisions relating to purchase,
ownership, and use of firearms).
2Data
in support of this include the fact that, in Brooklyn, New York, between
1990 and 1993, juries acquitted in state gun possession cases "at an average rate of
56%, in contrast to an overall acquittal rate of approximately 35% and in sharp
contrast to a rate of 28.7% in narcotics cases during the same period." David N.
Dorfman & Chris K. lijima, Fictions, Fault, and Forgiveness: Jury Nullification in a
New Context, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 861, 886-87 (1995).
24See Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 17, at 258-85 (discussing jurors' treatment of cases
they deem "de minimis").
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lieve such an apparently sweeping law to be inappropriate, and
nullify on that basis.' Or she might be unduly demanding of the
government on the possession issue, having little fear that a defendant wrongfully acquitted of such a piddling crime would
pose any danger to society.'
Forced to accept the introduction of some reference to their

criminal past and understandably choosing not to rely on cautionary instructions.' many defendants (particularly those with
convictions for violent crimes) sought to preclude the govern-

ment from proving the nature of their prior felony by offering to
stipulate that they had the requisite felony record. Their efforts
were largely successful in a majority of the Circuits.'

And the

defensive measure will be uniformly available after Old Chief.
B. Old Chief
Justice Souter's reasoning in Old Chief was straightforward:
The availability of "alternative proofs" of a defendant's felony
status does not make evidence specifying the nature of his prior
offense "irrelevant" under the Rules.29 Yet a trial judge must
consider the existence of such an alternative when balancing
21 See id. at 286-97 (discussing acquittals in cases involving unpopular laws); Wright,
Rossi & Daly, supra note 21, at 241 ("There is very little popular support for an
outright ban on private ownership of handguns.... Large majorities believe that they
have a right to own guns and that the Constitution guarantees that right.").
26See Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 17, at 165 ("Liberation" hypothesis explains
interplay between evidence and jury sentiment: "The sentiment gives direction to the
resolution of the evidentiary doubt; the evidentiary doubt provides a favorable condition for a response to the sentiment."); Lempert, supra note 17, at 1032 (modeling
jury decisionmaking according to regret matrix).
21See Miguel Angel Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA
L. Rev. 1003, 1049 (1984); Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of
Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on
Guilt, 9 Law & Hum. Behav. 37 (1985); see also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 575
(1967) (Warren, CJ., dissenting) ("[lit flouts human nature to suppose that a jury
would not consider a defendant's previous trouble with the law in deciding whether
he has committed the crime currently charged against him.").
28See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
2" Old Chief,117 S. Ct. at 649. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (defining relevance as "having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence").
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"probative value" against "the danger of unfair prejudice," as
required by Rule 403? o "Unfair prejudice," Justice Souter reasoned, would occur were jurors, presented with evidence of a
defendant's prior felony, to "generaliz[e] a defendant's earlier
bad act into bad character and tak[e] that as raising the odds
that he did the later bad act now charged (or, worse, as calling
for preventive conviction even if he should be innocent momentarily).'
The risk of such prejudice will "vary from case to
case," but will be particularly great where the prior conviction is
"for a gun crime or one similar to other charges in [the] pending
case."3Z Under such circumstances, or whenever "the prior conviction is for an offense likely to support conviction on some

improper ground," a trial judge would abuse her discretion if
she allowed the government to communicate the nature of a de-

fendant's prior felony, notwithstanding his offer to concede that
element.3 Such a concession, the Court recognized, could not
properly be called a "stipulation" in the absence of government
consent, but would be fully admissible as an "admission, ' and,
as such, would be a more satisfactory evidentiary alternative
under Rule 403.
Justice Souter took the time to respond to the government's
invocation of the "familiar" rule "that a criminal defendant may
not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of

30Fed.
3'

R. Evid. 403.

Old Chief,117 S. Ct. at 650.

"1Id. at 652.
33 Id. at 655. Although the Court has frequently avowed its confidence that juries
will abide by limiting instructions, see, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573,

585 (1994); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987), lower courts have noted
that such instructions may not be sufficient when evidence of prior crimes is introduced. See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 918 (3d Cir.
1992); United States v. DeCastris, 798 F.2d 261, 264 (7th Cir. 1986) (telling jury not to
consider prior crimes as evidence of defendant's bad character "is like telling
someone not to think about a hippopotamus"). The decision in Old Chief reflects the

same skepticism.
Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 653 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (rule states that
"party's own statement in either an individual or a representative capacity" deemed
"not hearsay" when offered against that party)). See Black's Law Dictionary 48 (6th
ed. 1990) (defining "judicial admissions" as "formal acts done by a party or his
attorney in court ... for the purpose of dispensing with proof by the opposing party
of some fact claimed by the latter to be true").
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the case as the government chooses to present it."35 As a general matter, he conceded the argument's power:
When a juror's duty does seem hard, the evidentiary account of
what a defendant has thought and done can accomplish what
no set of abstract statements ever could, not just to prove a fact
but to establish its human significance, and so to implicate the
law's moral underpinnings and a juror's obligation to sit in
judgment. Thus, the prosecution may fairly seek to place its
evidence before the jurors, as much to tell a story of guiltiness
as to support an inference of guilt, to convince the jurors that a
guilty verdict would be morally reasonable as much as to point
to the discrete elements of a defendant's legal fault.36
The prosecution also has an interest, Justice Souter noted, in
satisfying juror "expectations about what proper proof should
be": "A party seemingly responsible for cloaking something has
reason for apprehension, and the prosecution with its burden of
proof may prudently demur at a defense request to 37interrupt the
flow of evidence telling the story in the usual way.
Having noted the force of these arguments in other contexts,
however, the Court found that they had "no application when
the point at issue is a defendant's legal status, dependent on
some judgment rendered wholly independently of the concrete
events of later criminal behavior charged against him."' The
"events behind the prior conviction" are not "proper nourishment for the jurors' sense of obligation to vindicate the public
interest," and "[p]roving status without telling exactly why that
status was imposed leaves no gap in the story of a defendant's
subsequent criminality."39
These assumptions about how a jury will approach a felon-inpossession case are a bit disingenuous. If, as Pennington and
Hastie have persuasively suggested, jurors "impose a narrative
story organization on trial information,"' it would be odd in- Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 653.
36Id. at 653-54.
37Id. at

654.

18Id. at 654-55.
3Id.
at 655.

,0Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making,
in Inside the Juror: The Psychology of Juror Decision Making 192, 194 (Reid Hastie
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deed if this story did not comprehend that which makes gun
possession a federal crime, or a crime at all. In a country where
many believe there to be a fundamental, even constitutional,
right to gun possession,' a jury's decision about whether convicting a prior felon for possessing a gun is "morally reasonable"
will inevitably turn, at least in part, on the nature of that prior
felony. Indeed, Justice Souter admits as much when he observes
that "an extremely old conviction for a relatively minor felony
that nevertheless qualifies under the statute might strike many
jurors as a foolish basis for convicting an otherwise upstanding
member of the community of otherwise legal gun possession."' 2
When jurors are not told what a defendant's prior felony was,
from what will they construct the story of his criminality? One
source of inferences might be the circumstances of the charged
firearms possession. 3 The prior felony of a defendant arrested
at night near a gas station with a concealed weapon "must" be
robbery.' If the facts of the arrest suggest some connection with
ed., 1993) (emphasis omitted). See also .Reid Hastie, Steven D. Penrod & Nancy
Pennington, Inside the Jury 15-36 (1983); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519
(1991); W. Lance Bennett & Martha S. Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the
Courtroom: Justice and Judgment in American Culture (1981) (arguing that jurors
use storytelling techniques to interpret information presented in criminal trials).
41 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994) ("the fact remains that
there is a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in
this country"); Sourcebook, supra note 9, at 193 tbl.2.84 (60% of people polled in
1993 said there "should not be a law that would ban the possession of handguns
except by the police and other authorized persons").
42 Old Chief,117 S.Ct. at 652-53 n.8.
41One of the few jury deliberations ever filmed and televised involved a Wisconsin
trial of a defendant on state felon-in-possession charges. Frontline #410: Inside the
Jury Room (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1986) [hereinafter Inside the Jury
Room]. Although defense counsel conceded all the elements of the offense in his
opening, the jury ultimately acquitted. In their deliberations, jurors focused on the
sympathetic circumstances of the defendant's possession. A man of limited intelligence, he wanted to be a private investigator and believed from watching his favorite
television program that all one needed to become a private investigator was to carry
a pistol. During the taped parts of the trial and deliberations, no one made any
mention of the nature of the defendant's prior felony. See Dorfman & Iijima, supra
note 23, at 880-81 (discussing the documentary).
"These facts come from a recent case in which a § 922(g)(1) defendant raised the
oddest claim of prejudice I have yet found. In United States v. Wiman, 77 F.3d 981
(7th Cir. 1996), defendant argued that the trial court should not have excluded
evidence that he was carrying burglary tools when he was arrested at night near a gas
station. Unaware of this evidence, he claimed, jurors might have assumed that he
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drug dealing, his prior "surely was" a narcotics conviction. The
prior crime of the § 922(g)(1) defendant also charged with bank
robbery might be bank robbery.'5
But a far more dangerous source of inferences--dangerous
because of their systematic impact-will be the defendant's personal characteristics: his race, gender, socio-economic status, or
some combination thereof.' Presented with a young black male,
for example, and told that he has been convicted of some unspecified crime, jurors will be far more likely to decide that the
prior crime was, say, robbery or drug dealing, as opposed to
fraud.' And the past transgression of a middle-aged middlewas involved in a botched robbery, which is worse than burglary. The Seventh
Circuit wondered how this evidence could have made any difference to the jury's
consideration of the § 922(g)(1) charge, and noted that defendant could have offered
the proof himself.
4Cases
in which a defendant faces multiple counts that include a § 922(g)(1) charge
raise special issues of prejudice. The jury hearing evidence of other serious crimes
will be inclined to assume that the defendant's prior felony was a serious offense and
consequently be more prone to convict on the gun count. And knowledge, acquired
from the § 922(g)(1) count, that the defendant already has a felony record can make
the jury more ready to convict on the joined counts. These dangers have led courts to
mandate the severance of § 922(g)(1) counts. See United States v. Dockery, 955 F.2d
50,54-56 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Because I suspect that joined counts, when present, play a
larger role in jury speculations as to the nature of an unspecified prior felony than do
defendant characteristics, much of the discussion herein focuses on cases in which the
§ 922(g)(1) charge is the sole count before the jury.
46 See Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice: Jurors' Notions of the Law 72
(1995) ("[P]rospective jurors are likely to have in their memories representations of
crimes, actors, and outcomes: images of what certain crimes look like, the types of
people who commit such crimes, and the types of harm that ensue." (citations
omitted)).
Once a juror decides what a defendant's prior felony must have been, the details of
that crime will quickly come to mind, even (or perhaps particularly) in the absence of
any evidence. See id. at 72-74; Loretta J. Stalans, Citizens' Crime Stereotypes,
Biased Recall, and Punishment Preferences in Abstract Cases: The Educative Role of
Interpersonal Sources, 17 Law & Hum. Behav. 451 (1993); Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes
in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 857 (1991).
4" See Michael Sunnafrank & Norman E. Fontes, General and Crime Related Racial
Stereotypes and Influence on Juridic Decisions, 17 Cornell J. Soc. Rel. 1 (1983); see
also Adeno Addis, "Hell Man, They Did Invent Us": The Mass Media, Law, and
African-Americans, 41 Buff. L. Rev. 523 (1993) (arguing that the mainstream media
produces a negative image of African Americans); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race
and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 Minn. L.
Rev. 367, 402-23 (1996) (discussing the stereotype of African Americans as criminals); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev.
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class white defendant can be presumed to be quite benign
(albeit technically illegal). Instructions that jurors not speculate
as to a defendant's prior crime will not prevent such stereotyping. They will simply drive it underground by deterring jurors
from discussing the matter during deliberations."
C. The Prosecutor'sPurpose
The rule in Old Chief thus tends to put the prosecution at a
disadvantage in all cases involving defendants with criminal records that jurors would take seriously were they to learn of them.
These are the cases where defendants will offer admissions to a
generic felony with alacrity. Defendants whom jurors incorrectly presume benign will do best, for the jury will now never
think otherwise. Those whose odious records conform to the
stereotypes now driving juror speculations will benefit marginally from the uncertainty created by the rule, if jurors are less inflamed by speculation about the prior crimes than they would
be if presented with certain proof.
Although the Court appears willfully blind to the effects of its
rule on the government's prospects at trial, Justice Souter's
analysis is far more convincing when read, not as description of
jury behavior, but as a determination that prosecutors must accept the consequences of a statute that reaches far too many
cases that do not comport with popular notions of criminality.
The Court's assessment of what constituted "proper nourishment for the jurors' sense of obligation to vindicate the public
interest" 9 ends up turning on how Congress chose to define the
public interest:
Congress... has made it plain that distinctions among generic
felonies do not count for this purpose; the fact of the qualifying
conviction is alone what matters under the statute. "A defen1611, 1633 (1985) (discussing Sunnafrank and Fontes's studies showing that certain

crimes were more frequently attributed to African Americans); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1739, 1751 (1993) (noting how, in
summations, some prosecutors use the "image of African Americans as more violent
and more criminal than whites").
48Cf. Hastie, Penrod & Pennington, supra note 40, at 231-32 (finding that evidence
stricken from record will generally not be discussed in deliberations but may still

have impact).
41

Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655.
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dant falls within the category simply by virtue of past conviction for any [qualifying] crime ranging from possession of short
lobsters, see 16 U.S.C. § 3372, to the most aggravated murder."
The most the jury needs to know is that the conviction admitted by the defendant falls within the class of crimes that Congress thought should bar a convict from possessing a gun....'
Jurors might indeed take § 922(g)(1) prosecutions less seriously,
and consequently be less likely to return guilty verdicts, when
precluded from the learning the particulars of defendants' prior
records. But if Congress is going to legislate so broadly, the
Court suggests, perhaps § 922(g)(1) offenses ought to be taken
less seriously."
In the context of individual cases, the handicap that the Court
places on the government by refusing to recognize the eviden10Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Tavares,
21 F3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1994) (en banc)). Here, the Court echoed the First Circuit's point
in Tavares:
The [felony] status element is a discrete and independent component of the
crime, a requirement reflecting a Congressional policy that possession of a firearm is categorically prohibited for those individuals who have been convicted
of a wide assortment of crimes calling for a punishment of over a year's imprisonment.... The predicate crime is significant only to demonstrate status, and a
full picture of that offense is-even if not prejudicial-beside the point.
Tavares, 21 F.3d at 4. It was the First Circuit that first made the lobsterman the
poster-boy § 922(g) defendant. In Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977),
Justice Stewart had his own favorite: the bookkeeper who owns a hunting rifle, gets
convicted of embezzlement, and fails to relinquish possession of his firearm. Id. at
579-81 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
11
The care with which Congress legislates in this area was most recently shown in
the September 30, 1996 passage of a provision that extended § 922(g)'s ban on
convicted felons' possession of firearms to include individuals with prior misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009-371 to -372 (1996) (codified at
18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(9) (West 1997)). Soon thereafter, local police departments
complained that enforcement of the law would require more than 60,000 police
officers to turn in their weapons. Business Wire, New Law Could Force More Than
60,000 Cops to Turn in Their Guns, Survey Shows, Feb. 25, 1997, available in
WESTLAW, Allnewsplus File. See also Naftali Bendavid, A Political Gunfight,
Legal Times, Mar. 3, 1997, at 19 (police leaders estimate that "several hundred cops"
affected); Roberto Suro & Philip P. Pan, Law's Omission Disarms Some Police:
Domestic Violence Act Has Some Officers Hanging Up Their Guns, Wash. Post,
Dec. 27, 1996, at A16 (describing how blanket exception for official use was dropped
during rush to pass appropriations legislation that included the new domestic
violence provision). Two bills to amend the provision are now pending in the House,
each supported by various police organizations. Bendavid, supra, at 19.
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tiary disadvantages created by generic defense concessions is
thus understandable. A little odd, perhaps, since the same logic
would counsel a rule preventing the prosecution from telling the
jury about the quantity of drugs in a charged drug transaction.'
But it may be justifiable (if one resorts to the kind of deterrent
logic that supports constitutional exclusionary rules). Far less
justifiable are the disadvantages that the Court's approach threatens to impose on § 922(g)(1) defendants. The extent of this
threat in the individual case largely turns on whether defendants
will be permitted to inform juries about the nature of their prior
felonies if they so choose-in other words, on whether the analysis in Old Chief will be applied asymmetrically or symmetrically.
If he has this option, the defendant whose prior conviction
was for some "technical, non-violent or white collar crime"' and
who was prejudiced because the jury did not learn these specifics can fault only his lawyer, not the Court. And the Court certainly assumed a rule of defendant control. Referring to that
"extremely old conviction for a relatively minor felony," which
would "strike many jurors as a foolish basis for convicting an
otherwise upstanding" defendant, Justice Souter noted: "Since
the Government could not, of course, compel the defendant to
admit formally the existence of the prior conviction, the Government would have to bear the risk of jury nullification, a fact
that might properly drive the Government's charging decision. '
This reasoning misperceives the government's evidentiary options. A prosecutor wishing to avoid telling the jury about a defendant's piddling prior conviction will not be able to obtain a
stipulation or judicial admission from an unwilling defendant.
He can, however, find other ways of proving that a defendant
has a prior felony without alerting the jury to its nature. If interrogation responses or court, prison, or parole documents do
-52Quantity is not an element of the federal narcotics distribution offense, but goes
only to sentencing. See United States v. Campuzano, 905 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 947 (1990); United States v. Brown, 887 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir.
1989). I know of no case where a court barred the government from proving the
quantity of drugs, and I do not imagine the absence of such a precedent can be
attributed to the failure of any defendant ever to concede that a charged possession
or distribution did involve drugs.
Tavares, 21 F.3d at 4.
Old Chief,117 S. Ct. at 652-53 n.8.
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not already provide this kind of generic evidence (perhaps with
references to specific felonies edited out), the government might
that do-documents admissible as
start generating documents
"official records."55 A defendant could not fairly complain that
the information thus conveyed is incomplete or misleading. Nor
could he necessarily count on being able to tell the jury about
his felony during his own case: A trial judge adhering to the
logic of Old Chief-and to the approach of the First Circuit in
United States v. Tavares' that the Supreme Court found so persuasive -would say that such information, albeit marginally
"relevant," poses an unacceptable risk of prejudice to the government. Trial judges precluding defense proof on this issue
will presumably rely on Old Chiefs pronouncement that the issue of legal status is binary, not requiring "evidentiary depth."58
In short, there is nothing in Old Chief to prevent lower courts
from applying the decision symmetrically, other than the
Court's wishful thinking.
The consequences of a regime in which the government, when
it suits its purposes, can prevent defendants from telling about
their prior felonies, are particularly troubling. A prosecutor is
most likely to pursue that tactic where a defendant's past felony
is relatively benign, and will profit most where jurors' stereotypes are most pejorative. The resulting disadvantage to defendants cannot be excused by pointing to statutory overbreadth.
Here endeth the standard evidentiary analysis, focusing, as
most such analyses do, on the effects of the Court's rule on a
range of hypothetical cases. Yet some of the foregoing hypotheticals may be beside the point as a practical matter. What
difference does it make, for example, if Old Chiefs reasoning is
susceptible to symmetrical application, if the government never
brings § 922(g)(1) cases against defendants with relatively in-

- Fed. R. Evid. 803(8).
521

F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994 ) (en banc).

-The Tavares court reasoned that to allow either side to raise or reduce the stakes

of a § 922(g)(1) prosecution by alluding to the nature of a defendant's prior felony
would subvert congressional policy by replacing the "neutral role intended to be
played by the prior felony element" with a "two-tier system of guilt determination."
Id. at 4.
5Old Chief,117 S. Ct. at 654.
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nocuous records? This raises a question that transcends evidence doctrine: Will the government avoid prosecuting these
defendants? And if it doesn't prosecute them, why not? What
discourages it from doing so? Or, to be more precise, what factors offset the consequences of a regime that endeavors to
bleach out differences among § 922(g)(1) defendants? One can
go further and ask more generally about the significance of all
such evidentiary rules in our criminal justice system. Certainly,
they affect the proof that jurors hear at trial and, presumably,
the verdicts they reach. By extension, they presumably affect
negotiated dispositions that turn, to some degree, on the likelihood of the government's success at trial. But do they have
more systemic consequences?
II. OF EVIDENTIARY RULES AND PROSECUTORIAL DIScRETIoN

Regardless of how Old Chief affects defendants in individual
cases, and regardless of whether the decision is read to permit
defendant control over the introduction of prior felony information, it will have no systematic effects on defendant incentives.
Defendants, after all, are one-shot players, interested only in
achieving immediate, favorable results in their respective cases.
But to the extent this rule, indeed any evidentiary rule, affects a
prosecutor's chances of success, one might expect its impact to
be transferred onto case selection decisions. Perhaps because
the issue crosses the artificial border between Evidence and
Criminal Procedure, all too little attention is generally paid to
the influence that proof restrictions can, or should, have on the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
A. ProsecutorialProfessionalismand Accountability
Every prosecuting office-and every prosecutor, to some extent-faces a daunting range of targets against which to deploy
relatively scarce resources. 9 Some of the decisions are quite
See Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 Am.
J. Comp. L. 532, 533-34 (1970). The options from among which a prosecutor must
choose are shaped by such constraints as the crime rate, the size of the jurisdiction's
population, and his office's budget allocation. See Joan E. Jacoby, The Charging
Policies of Prosecutors, in The Prosecutor 75, 77-78 (William F. McDonald ed., 1979).
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general: White collar criminals or violent offenders? Higher
level drug traffickers or street peddlers? With a broadly defined
policy agenda set, the finer-grained questions will emerge: Which
street robbers are most deserving of punishment? Which illegal
gun cases? The response to a particular case need not be binary. Prosecution can be declined. Prosecution might be initiated, but with little commitment of investigative or adjudicative
resources. Or the maximum penalty can be pursued hotly. As a
practical matter, such choices are obviously not committed solely
to the discretion of prosecutors. Indeed, the most important
factors in determining who gets prosecuted for what are the decisions of supervisory and line personnel in police departments
or investigative agencies. But once those enforcement entities
have done their winnowing, the scope of prosecutorial discretion remains immense.6
On what basis should prosecutors makes these choices? We
are somewhat of two minds on this point, subscribing to ideals
of professionalism and political responsibility that sometimes
conflict.
1. Professionalism
On one hand, we celebrate the professional independence of
prosecutors. We expect them to set their priorities based on
such considerations as the responsiveness of a social problem to
criminal sanctions, the nature of the harm, "1 and the maximiza-

IoSee James Eisenstein, Counsel for the United States: U.S. Attorneys in the

Political and Legal Systems 156-57 (1978); W. Boyd Littrell, Bureaucratic Justice:
Police, Prosecutors, and Plea Bargaining (1979) (discussing role of discretion in
otherwise bureaucratic administration of justice); see also H. Richard Uviller,
Tempered Zeal: A Columbia Professor's Year on the Streets with New York City
Police 20-26 (1988) (describing police attitudes towards discretionary calls by prose-

cutors, including specifically decisions not to prosecute); Joseph Goldstein, Police
Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale LJ. 543, 554-55 n.20, 560 n.28 (1960) (discussing influence
of prosecutorial decisions on police decisionmaking).

61See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17
J. Legal Stud. 43, 65 (1988) ("To minimize the social cost of crime, the prosecutor

cannot simply attempt to minimize the total number of crimes; she must evaluate the

harm associated with each offense and determine the mix of prosecutions that will minimize the total quantum of harm."); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-3.9(b)(ii)
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tion of deterrence. " Criminal sanctions are blunt instruments,
and for many technical transgressions, the better approach is either diversion or simple declination. Prosecutors thus emerge
as mediators between phenomenally broad legislative pronouncements 3 and the equities of individual cases, and as technical judges of when evidence is sufficient to proceed. Politics
should have nothing to do with the prosecutorial process, and
we condemn the ambitious prosecutor suspected of "pandering"
to public opinion in her selection of cases." Indeed, after they
decide to pursue charges, prosecutors are expected to maintain
an extraordinary degree of professional perspective, to serve as
"Ministers of Justice" even as they engage in advocacy.'
(1986) (prosecutor may properly consider "extent of the harm caused by the offense")
[hereinafter ABA Standards].
6 Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud.
289, 295-96 (1983) (prosecutor "attempts to obtain the maximum deterrence from his
available resources... by bringing new prosecutions until the marginal deterrence
available from investing extra resources in a given prosecution is the same as the
return available from investing in some other prosecution"); see William M. Landes,
An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & Econ. 61, 63 (1971) (prosecutor seeks
"to maximize the expected number of convictions weighted by their respective [sentences] ... subject to a constraint on the resources or budget available to his office"
(footnote omitted)); cf. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 717 (1996) (arguing that exercise of prosecutorial discretion
should be tied to availability of prison resources).
6See ABA Standards, supra note 61, § 3-3.9 commentary, at 3-56 (referring to
"breadth of criminal legislation").
6See H. Richard Uviller, Virtual Justice: The Flawed Prosecution of Crime in
America 163 (1996) (finding "the political factor in the calculation of discretion to be
profoundly offensive, bordering on unethical"); see also Michael W. Dolan, Political
Influence on the Department of Justice: Are the Pressures Only External?, 9 J.L. &
Pol. 309, 312 (1993) ("Rare is the federal prosecutor who has not been described by his
or her enemies as politically ambitious...."). When Rudolph Giuliani was United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, his worst critics would accuse
him of being "political." See, e.g., William Safire, Guarding the Guardians, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 24, 1986, at A15 (alluding to "political prosecutors who will do anything
for publicity"); Teri Agins, Prosecutor Giuliani, New York's Top Crimebuster,
Aggressively Courts Convictions, Media Attention, Wall St. J., May 13,1986, at 64.
Perhaps the most quoted invocation of this ideal comes from Justice Sutherland:
[The prosecutor] is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law,
the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer... It
is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one.

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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The call for professionalism first came in the 1920s and 1930s
from those who decried the corruption and favoritism infecting
so many prosecutorial offices.' The ideal is thus, at least in part,
negative-one of insulation from narrow interest groups and
corrupt influences.' But it has developed far further, into a robust belief, as an affirmative matter, that independent-minded
prosecutors are well-placed to divine the public interest, and to
harmonize ill-defined legislative policies with principles of individualized justice.' The notion has withstood decades of wellreasoned calls for guidelines and rulemaking to cabin broad
prosecutorial discretion. 9 And it remains embedded, even as the
"See, e.g., Raymond Moley, Politics and Criminal Prosecution 25 (1929) (In some
recent scandals, "[plrosecution was feeble and incompetent because prosecutors' offices
were political agencies rather than law offices. Insidious relationships existed between
shady characters and public officials because votes and party funds were involved.");
see also Misner, supra note 62, at 730 n.80 (citing similar critiques from 1920s and
1930s).
6In
his oft-quoted speech made while he was Attorney General, Robert Jackson
explained "why the prosecutor should have, as nearly as possible, a detached and
impartial view of all groups in his community." Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940)).
"See ABA Standards, supra note 61, § 3-3.9 commentary, at 3-56 ("The public
interest is best served and evenhanded justice best dispensed not by the mechanical
application of the 'letter of the law,' but by a flexible and individualized application
of its norms through the exercise of a prosecutor's thoughtful discretion."); Frank W.
Miller, American Bar Foundation, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with
a Crime 154 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1969) ("With rare exceptions, legislatures and
appellate judges officially approve of this allocation of power to prosecutors ....").
6See,
e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 188214 (1969); Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1971); Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law
Enforcement, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 427 (1960); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1521 (1981).
Legislators' aversion to taking more control in this area presents an interesting
public choice question, particularly in the federal context. Much criminal legislation
may stem from legislators' desire to pander to popular opinion, particularly in the
wake of some infamous crime. See Sanford H. Kadish, Comment, The Folly of
Overfederalization, 46 Hastings U.J. 1247, 1248 (1995). But why write laws with a
generality that places such power in the Executive's hands? Perhaps the explanation
has something to do with legislators' desire to insulate themselves from those on
whom the costs of criminal enforcement fall heaviest, see Peter H. Aranson, Ernest
Gelhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L.
Rev. 1, 57-58 (1982), or to avoid the opportunity costs of legislative specification, see
Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Criminal Law?, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 469, 475
(1996) ("[m1ime spent enacting criminal legislation necessarily comes at the expense
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proliferation of substantive criminal enactments and the use of
sentencing guidelines have vastly increased prosecutorial power."
2. Accountability
Yet for all the apparent confidence in the judgment of the
professionals, the idea that prosecutors should be broadly responsive to the concerns of their community also runs deep.
Where reasonable minds might differ on how prosecutorial reof time that could be spent enacting legislation sought by small, highly organized
interest groups, which are more likely than the public at large to reward legislators
for benefits conferred and to punish them for disabilities imposed."). In addition,
vagueness allows the evasion of tough legislative choices. See Charles R. Wise, The
Dynamics of Legislation 178 (1991). Yet none of these hypotheses fully explains, for
example, the sustained, albeit fruitless, attention Congress gave to the monumental
task of revising the entire federal criminal code in the 1970s, the extent of congressional activity on sentencing issues, see, e.g., Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81
Cal. L. Rev. 61 (1993); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a
Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 1233 (1996), occasional congressional investigations into allegedly inappropriate prosecutorial leniency to certain
white collar defendants, see, e.g., Theodora Galacatos, Note, The United States
Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section: A Case Study of Inter- and
Intrabranch Conflict Over Congressional Oversight and the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 587, 612-28 (1995), or why the breadth of criminal
statutes does not seem to turn on the political power of the groups most likely to be
affected. It is particularly remarkable that Congress continues to legislate so broadly
at a time when the prevalence of crime control rhetoric makes calls for leniency in
particular cases or the use of purse strings politically difficult. In other contexts, the
legislator who supported a broad delegation of authority to an executive agency can
later seek credit for intervening with the "bureaucrats." See Glen 0. Robinson,
American Bureaucracy: Public Choice and Public Law 77 (1991) (noting suggestion
"that the creation of administrative agencies with delegated power enhances the
legislator's opportunity for vote-winning casework"). But the political costs of
intervening to protect a petitioner from criminal prosecution are generally prohibitive. See Suzanne Weaver, Decision to Prosecute: Organization and Public Policy in
the Antitrust Division 151-60 (1977) (overt legislative interference in prosecutorial
decisionmaking perceived as too politically dangerous, and lower-visibility efforts
rare for same reason).
One short answer may be that the public might blame legislators for failing to
criminalize conduct it condemns, but will blame only prosecutors for bringing charges
in a marginal case. Given this dynamic, legislators will always be safer if they err on
the side of overinclusion. The longer answer must explain how these assumptions
about prosecutorial power arose in the first place.
10See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 Cal. L.
Rev. 1471 (1993); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. _ (forthcoming 1997) (on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association).
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sources might be deployed, community preferences are thought
to be critical. Even though a professional prosecutor residing in
the jurisdiction she serves may share the concerns of its citizenry,71 some formal mechanism is thought necessary to ensure
that the "people"' have a voice in how she deploys resources in
their name' That is why most state and local jurisdictions originally chose to make their chief prosecutors elected officials,74
and presumably why mos 5 of those offices remain elective." It
71See Eisenstein, supra note 60, at 198 ("[The] participation [of U.S. attorneys] in the
life of the community, a participation that continues after working hours and on weekends and which will continue in the years after they leave the U.S. attorney's office,
practically guarantees that if the dominant political stratum agrees on a policy issue, the
U.S. attorney will share these views." But this mechanism "does not provide guid-

ance ...on what to do in specific situations.").

72State prosecutions are generally styled as cases of "The People" against the named
defendant. Federal prosecutions name "The United States" as the plaintiff.
13See James N. Johnson, The Influence of Politics upon the Office of the American
Prosecutor, 2 Am. J. Crim. L. 187, 190-91 (1973) (discussing public support for popular election of prosecutors). Prosecutors and attorneys general are characterized as
"representatives" under the Voting Rights Act when they are subject to elections.
See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
In this sense, we are far less "ambivalent" about the election of prosecutors than
we are about the election of judges. See Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and
Accountability, 61 S.Cal. L. Rev. 1571 (1988) (describing contradicting defenses of
judicial independence); Ruth Gavison, The Implications of Jurisprudential Theories
for Judicial Election, Selection, and Accountability, 61 S.Cal. L. Rev. 1617 (1988)
(discussing theories of law in relation to judicial accountability); cf. Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987) ("The requirement of a
disinterested prosecutor is consistent with our recognition that prosecutors may not
necessarily be held to as stringent a standard of disinterest as judges.").
74Kathryn Abrams has observed that:
The decision to make state prosecutors elective, which came at the same time
as the move to elect state judges, reflects many of the same judgments: a
Jacksonian-inspired belief in the importance of popular accountability, and a
belief that such accountability can be reconciled with the need for independence and meritorious performance of duty without completely submerging the
latter values.
Kathryn Abrams, Relationships of Representation in Voting Rights Act Jurisprudence, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1409, 1425 n.83 (1993). See Joan E. Jacoby, The American
Prosecutor: A Search for Identity 19-28 (1980).
7'See John M. Dawson, Steven K. Smith & Carol J. DeFrances, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Prosecutors in State Courts, 1992, at 2 (1993) (more than 95% of state and
local
chief prosecutors are elected).
76
The continued reliance on the political process for selecting chief prosecutors is
particularly noteworthy in light of the trend toward insulating police management
and judicial selection from electoral politics. See Alan Edward Bent, The Politics of
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also may explain-or at least justify-the significant, often dispositive, influence that state and local politics can have over the
appointment of United States attorneys.2
To be sure, the idea of a prosecutor picking targets simply to
please her electorate is repugnant (save perhaps in some exceptional cases).78 But so is the notion of an official never being
held accountable for her judgment calls, made in the name of
the people, about what policies will best serve the community. 9
Law Enforcement: Conflict and Power in Urban Communities 64-66, 155 (1974);
Albert J. Reiss, Jr., The Police and the Public 186-89 (1971) (describing how increased bureaucratization of police forces has made them less responsive to civic and
political power); see also Misner, supra note 62, at 766 ("The movement toward
appointed judges, non-partisan selected judges, or judges appointed and then subject
to a vote of retention (the 'Missouri Plan') have [sic] not found analogous developments in the election of local prosecutors.").
InSee Eisenstein, supra note 60, at 35-53; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
728 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Under our system of government, the primary
check against prosecutorial abuse is a political one."). But see Eisenstein, supra note
60, at 194-95 (compared to local prosecutors, U.S. attorneys have considerable independence from local politics); cf. Griffin B. Bell & Daniel J. Meador, Appointing
United States Attorneys, 9 J.L. & Pol. 247 (1993) (arguing that vesting Attorney
General with complete control over selection of U.S. attorneys would remove influence of local politics and therefore be beneficial).
78 Absolutes are difficult here. Although the federal government, as a matter of
law, is free to prosecute those acquitted in state court of crimes that can be
recharacterized as federal offenses, see Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959),
exercises of that power, in the absence of state corruption, are exceedingly rare, see
Daniel C. Richman, Bargaining About Future Jeopardy, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1181, 1199
(1996). One who supports the recent federal prosecutions in the Rodney King beating
case and the Crown Heights murder case (as I do) is hard pressed to find any neutral
principle (other than respect for the popular will) that distinguishes these cases from
the universe of similar "unjust" acquittals that were not pursued. See Editorial, The
Right to Walk a Brooklyn Street, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1994, at 20 (commending
Attorney General Reno for "respond[ing] to community anger" by pursuing federal
prosecution in Crown Heights case). Dressing this rationale up by pointing to the
need to ensure popular confidence in the judicial system does not change the point.
1 Defining a prosecutor's relevant "community" may occasionally be difficult.
Witness the recent controversy in New York City after Angel Diaz was charged with
first degree murder in the death of a police officer: Governor George Pataki had just
been elected on a platform that included the reinstatement (and regular use) of the
death penalty. Bronx District Attorney Robert Johnson had just been reelected after
making his opposition to capital punishment clear. When Johnson failed to show
sufficient enthusiasm for the death penalty in the case to satisfy Pataki, the governor
superseded Johnson and ordered the state's attorney general to preside over the
prosecution. See Rachel L. Swarns, Prosecutor Resists Pataki Pressure on Death
Penalty, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1996, at B1; Jan Hoffman, Death Penalty Raises Issue
of Obligation of Prosecutor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1996, at 33. The conflict somewhat
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Accountability may be important for all public servants in a democracy, but it is of particular significance for an official charged
with selecting targets for "community condemnation."'
The problem, however, is that even direct elections are not
likely to prove an effective means of giving prosecutors guidance as to a community's enforcement priorities or of holding
them accountable for the discretionary decisions that they have
already made. As Kenneth Davis noted:
The reality is that nearly all [the prosecutor's] decisions to
prosecute or not to prosecute... and nearly all his reasons for
decisions are carefully kept secret, so that review by the electorate is nonexistent, except for the occasional case that happens to be publicized. The plain fact is that more than ninetenths of local prosecutors' decisions are supervised or reviewed by no one."1
Many elections for chief prosecutor are not even contested. n
Those that are may be fought on whether a specific type of
crime should be prosecuted,' whether a murderer deserves exeabated following Diaz's suicide while in custody. See Rachel L. Swarns, Man Held in
Police Death is Found Hanged in Jail, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1996, at Al; Jan Hoffman,
Factions on Death Penalty Issue Gird for Battle, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1996, at B4; see
also In re Johnson, 61 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1004 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept, Mar. 20,
1997 (finding Johnson's challenge to Pataki's order non-justiciable).
0See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 401, 404 (1958) (difference between criminal and civil penalties is that "judgment
of community condemnation" accompanies criminal sanction); see also Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. at 712-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting "frightening" prospect of
being investigated by prosecutor neither selected by nor subject to control of the
President); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United
States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform,
54 Ohio St. L.. 1325, 1339 (1993) ("If someone is to decide which laws will be
aggressively enforced, which laws will be enforced occasionally, and which laws will
never be enforced, it makes sense that the person who has to answer to the voters will
make those determinations.").
81Davis, supra note 69, at 207-08. See Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of
Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 37, 54
(discussing low visibility of plea bargaining decisions).
9 See James Eisenstein, Politics and the Legal Process 21-22 (1973) (noting that
frequency of uncontested elections for this office "is probably unusually high" compared with those for other offices).
3See Jacoby, supra note 74, at 261 (Boulder County, Colorado D.A. "elected [in
1972] on a platform opposing the prosecution of lesser marijuana cases"); Carl
Quintanilla, A Prosecutor Wins Battle against Drugs but Loses the War, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 16, 1997, at Al (attributing electoral loss of county attorney in western Kansas to
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cution,' or on the loss of a high-profile case,85 as well as on an
office's overall win-loss record. Individual referenda on the
broad range of discretionary choices that every prosecutor makes
are unlikely, indeed utterly impossible.
The point is not new. In 1929, Roscoe Pound observed:
Political responsibility was a check on the prosecutor in a
proper sense in pioneer America, where dockets were small,
where the citizens in large and representative numbers attended all trials, where every one knew what the prosecutor did
public rejection of his "tenacious prosecution of [drug] smugglers apprehended in the
county").
" F. Thomas Schornhorst, Preliminary Screening of Prosecutorial Access to Death
Qualified Juries: A Missing Constitutional Link, 62 Ind. LJ. 295, 306 (1987) ("The
kinds of murders that excite a community's fervor for the death penalty are, relatively
speaking, rare occurrences. An elected prosecutor's choice to initiate a capital case
cannot be divorced from the prosecutor's desire for reelection.").
85In his fascinating study of one county, Stuart Scheingold noted:
[J]udges and prosecutors... preserved a significant measure of autonomy for
dealing with the overwhelming majority of their cases by giving up much of
their autonomy in those prosecutions that were inescapably politicized because
of the notoriety of the participants or of the circumstances. But the charges
strongly influenced by political calculations were something of a sideshow. In
this and other ways, public attention was diverted from the vast bulk of cases
that were dealt with according to sheltered routines.
Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Street Crime: Criminal Process and Cultural
Obsession 123 (1991).
One need not look far for examples of the role that high-profile cases can play in
the election of district attorneys. See Alan Abrahamson, Challenger Concedes D.A.
Race to Garcetti, L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 1996, at B3 ("By the narrowest of margins,
Garcetti... was reelected to a second term in a race that was widely viewed as a
referendum on the failed prosecution of the OJ. Simpson murder case."). The
Washington Post also reported that:
Despite his office's record of success in criminal cases, the non-partisan
primary campaign [for district attorney] was dominated by criticism that
Garcetti's deputies failed to win convictions in a string of high-profile trials,
including the Menendez brothers' first murder trial, rapper Snoopy Doggy
Dogg's murder trial and, most important of all, the marathon Simpson trial.
William Claiborne, L.A. District Attorney Garcetti Haunted by Case That Won't Go
Away, Wash. Post, Apr. 4, 1996, at A3. See also id. ("Garcetti acknowledged that
Los Angeles County has a long tradition of high-profile trials affecting political
contests....").
6 This is not to say that a prosecutor will feel the effects of the political process only
at election time. See Abrams, supra note 74, at 1419 (noting prosecutors' formal and
informal meetings with a "range of constituents, including organized interests such as
victims' rights groups"). The point 'goes to the generality, or, alternatively, the
narrowness of electorate's input.
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and how and why. Political responsibility kept him from doing
what he should not. Nowadays, politics are a check in an improper sense, hindering him from doing what he should."

Perhaps electoral or appointive politics' will ensure that the
community's preferences will at least be considered on some
broad issues of the guns vs. butter variety: Should enforcement
of the narcotics laws be favored over the enforcement of the
gambling laws? And, if narcotics trafficking is to be targeted,
how high a priority should be given to street dealers? But the
bulk of the discretionary decisions that prosecutors make turn
not on such broad matters of policy but on the individual circumstances of putative defendants, alleged victims, and other
such case-specific factors. Electoral or appointive politics are, at

best, a poor way of holding prosecutors accountable for this
myriad of low-visibility enforcement decisions. Even those
prosecutors who actively court community participation in decisionmaking!' may not hear views on such fine-grained matters.
Further, to the extent that views are expressed, the expressions

will tend to be from highly interested parties. Neither will any
help come from the courts, which-at least as a formal matter'-have declined to venture into this executive area, save in
the clearest cases of invidious discrimination. 9'
8 Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in America 185 (1930). See also Sam Earle
Hobbs, Prosecutor's Bias, An Occupational Disease, 2 Ala. L. Rev. 40, 45 (1949)
("Nowadays politics are a check in an improper sense, hindering the prosecutor.., from doing what he should" and "developing in him.., a frenetic zeal for
'getting results' in the form of convictions which transcend the bounds of civilized
morality." (quoting Pound, supra, at 185)).
18Electoral politics may be of particular interest to the prosecutor who hopes to
turn his position into a springboard for higher electoral office. See Scheingold, supra
note 85, at 130; Kahan, supra note 69, at 486. The political concerns of the prosecutor seeking advancement, however, presumably will not be very different from
those of the prosecutor seeking retention in a contested election.
"In the District of Columbia, for example, the United States Attorney recently
established a "community prosecution" program, placing a team of prosecutors in
closer contact with one community in the District. See Bill Miller, Prosecutors to Act
as Community Advocates; U.S. Attorney Begins Experimental Program, Wash. Post,
June 6,1996, at Jl; Sam Skolnik, Working the Streets, Legal Times, Nov. 27,1995, at 6.
"0See Eisenstein, supra note 60, at 132 ("[Flield research suggests that U.S. attorneys modify prosecutive decisions both in response to direct [albeit informal] initiatives of judges and through anticipation of judicial reactions."); id. at 133 ("Just as
certain types of cases are not prosecuted due to the cool reception they elicit from
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3. The Prosecutor'sMotivation
That the community's voice is not directly heard on finegrained matters of prosecutorial priorities, however, does not
mean that its preferences will not resound loudly in prosecutors'
offices. One need not posit that prosecutors feel any obligation
to represent their constituencies. It is enough that they seek to
maximize convictions.
It is surely simplistic to say that all prosecutors are primarily
interested in maximizing convictions.' Although an impressive
conviction rate will undoubtedly enhance personal and group
job security, the question remains: Why this job? The motivations of those attracted to a job for which the remuneration can
be comparatively low, in a legal market where the opportunities
to shirk abound, will be far more complex. Much work remains
to be done in exploring the personal ideologies of prosecutors,
judges, so too are others pushed vigorously because of obvious judicial interest in
them.").
91In United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996), the Court noted that a
"selective-prosecution claim asks a court to exercise judicial power over a 'special
province' of the Executive." Id. at 1486 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
832 (1985)). The Court also emphasized the onerous burden on any defendant seeking to prove that a decision to prosecute was based on "an unjustifiable standard such
as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368
U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). See also United States v. Wayte, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)
(describing federal courts as "properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to
prosecute"); Vorenberg, supra note 69.
92 Alissa Worden has noted that:
[R]esearch on prosecutors has been handicapped by overly simplified conceptions of prosecutorial motivations, such as the assumption that all prosecutors
strive to maximize convictions or to impose maximally harsh sentences, despite
the fact that interviews and observation have revealed considerable variation in
prosecutors' values and beliefs, incentives and role orientations.
Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking By Prosecutors: The Uses of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73 Judicature 335, 335 (1990).
93 Brian Grosman made a good start in his insightful study of a Canadian Crown
Attorney's Office:
The attractions of the prosecutorial office and its satisfactions are seldom
restricted to the evident training opportunities, the relative freedom from
supervisory control, or to the benefits derived from the variety of daily activities. The nature of the prosecuting institution itself, combining as it does the
considerable power components of the police and prosecuting establishments
and the authority of public morality and social control, draws to it those who
desire to act from a position of power.
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the influence of long-term economic self-interest,' and the psy-

chological aspects of prosecutors' self-selection.
Whatever prosecutors' private motivations are, however, the

need to maximize convictions will be an inescapable environmental constraint. This imperative is, in part, a function of the
political process. Those elections that are contested are often

fought on an incumbent's win-loss record,95 and an incumbent's
concerns inthis regard will be felt by his subordinates.' But the
need to maximize convictions arises from other sources as well.
Even in United States Attorneys' offices, where the chief can be
removed only by the President and her assistants are substan-

tially insulated from political pressure,' "[t]he need to win cases
constitutes the strongest incentive in the work environment of
assistants."" James Eisenstein found:
Brian A. Grosman, The Prosecutor: An Inquiry into the Exercise of Discretion 64
(1969).
14 See, e.g., Eisenstein, supra note 60, at 174 (finding that "the overwhelming majority of [assistant U.S. attorneys] seek the position not for the inherent rewards of
public service, but for the boost it can give their subsequent careers"); Richard S.
Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How Do
the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 Cal. L.
Rev. 539, 563 (1990) (contrasting American system with the French system of
"career" prosecutors); Weaver, supra note 69, at 162 (Antitrust Division and the
private bar "constitute two parts of a single job market").
"See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial 67
Notre Dame L. Rev. 403,442 n.164 (1992) ("Elected state prosecutors often face bitter
contests in which their win-loss record becomes a campaign issue."); Scheingold,
supra note 85, at 126 (noting that a "high conviction rate" is "frequently presented by
prosecutors as evidence of effective crime control"); id. at 136 (example of one such
campaign claim); Worden, supra note 92, at 337 ("Conviction rates constitute simplistic but easily advertised indicators of success, since they appear to measure prosecutors' ability to win cases.").
9A 1975 study of a number of prosecutors' offices found four different models of
prosecutorial policy: "legal sufficiency" (charges brought whenever elements of crime
present); "system efficiency" (aiming for speedy and early disposition of cases by any
means possible); "defendant rehabilitation"; and "trial sufficiency." Leonard R.
Mellon, Joan E. Jacoby & Marion A. Brewer, The Prosecutor Constrained by His
Environment: A New Look at Discretionary Justice in the United States, 72 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 52, 59 (1981). The study also found that line prosecutors in the
offices studied "generally tend[ed] to follow their policy leaders." Id. at 79. The
degree to which line prosecutors seek to maximize convictions will be influenced by
which of these models is selected by their superiors (to the degree these models are
still prevalent). See also Jacoby, supra note 74, at 201-05.
7 See Eisenstein, supra note 60, at 97.
" Id. at 152.
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[T]he standing of an assistant among his peers depends in part
on his conviction record. His record also determines his reputation among the judges and members of the private bar, and
this reputation in turn affects the job opportunities available
when he leaves. Furthermore, U.S. attorneys utilize conviction
rates to assess the work of their assistants. Despite the problems with conviction rates, they provide U.S. attorneys with a
means of comparing the performance of their assistants, judging the efficiency of manpower allocations, and demonstrating
to "a rather ill-defined public constituency" demanding convictions that they are fulfilling their obligation. A U.S. attorney's
standing with the local judges depends upon his ability to facilitate movement of the docket, which in the criminal area requires maintaining a high guilty plea rate. Without a high conviction rate, the guilty plea system is jeopardized."
The prosecutor's interest can also be described as one in
"non-defeat.""° As Jerome Skolnick explained:
In the county studied, the prosecutor's office cared less about
winning than about not losing. The norm is so intrinsic to the
rationale of the prosecutor's office that one does not often hear
it articulated. Nevertheless it is very powerful. It cannot be attributed to such a simple and obvious fact as the periodic requirement of reelection. Indeed, reelection seemed to be taken
for granted, and an observer would be hard put to relate prose9'Id. at 152-53. See Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal
Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretioh, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 246,
310-13 (1980) (discussing data showing that factors other than convictability account
for differential prosecution rates); John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A
Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. Rev. 174, 180-81 (1965); Sidney I. Lezak & Maureen Leonard,
The Prosecutor's Discretion: Out of the Closet, Not Out of Control, in Carl F.
Pinkele & William C. Louthan, Discretion, Justice, and Democracy: A Public Policy
Perspective 44,46 (1985) ("Winning is important not only for the ego satisfaction and
enhancement of reputations that victory brings, but also because a record of winning
makes it easier to dispose of cases by favorable plea bargains in the future."); Robert
L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 1036, 1045 (1972) (finding that "convictions
are the central performance standard" in U.S. Attorney's offices); Weaver, supra
note 69, at 144-45 (congressional hearings relating to oversight of Antitrust Division
focus on "cases brought, proportion of cases won, severity of sentences, and amounts
of fines and damages"); cf. Miller, supra note 68, at 22, 342-43 (conviction maximization hypothesis "must remain uncertain," not supported by field studies).
10Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. Conflict
Resol. 52,57 (1967).
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cutorial decisions directly to electoral requirements. Not only
does the prosecutor desire to maintain a respectable record,
but more than that, he seeks to maintain, insofar as possible, a
reputation for utter credibility ....
0'
"Credibility," Skolnick explains, "leads to victory, victory to...
quasi-magisterial status, and quasi-magisterial status to enhanced
credibility, all of which eases the task of the prosecutor. ''"" 2
4. The Community's Voice
Undoubtedly, prosecutors' drive to maximize convictions can
lead to, and has led to, some of their worst excesses-the tactics
of those for whom winning is everything. 3 Within the framework of a single case, this impulse is in tension with the
"Minister of Justice" ideal. Prosecutors, however, do not operate within the framework of a single case. Indeed, in a world of
plea bargaining, case selection is at least as important a part of a
prosecutor's job as case disposition. And in this broader perspective, the prosecutorial drive to maximize convictions emerges
as potentially the most effective mechanism for ensuring that
prosecutors consider community enforcement priorities over the
entire range of possible cases. This, in turn, becomes the principal means through which the community gains a voice in the
day-to-day decisions about who gets charged with what.
Thomas Jefferson once avowed:
Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be

omitted in the legislative or judiciary department, I would say it
is better to leave them out of the legislative. The execution of
the laws is more important than the making of them."l

101Id.

'0 Id. at 58.

113See George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look At Reality, 7 Sw. U. L. Rev.
98, 117 (1975) (use of conviction rate as measure of office efficiency stimulates
development of "conviction psychology" in prosecutors); Van Kessel, supra note 95,
at 447-58; Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
Can
Prosecutors Do Justice, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45 (1991).
0
'1
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to L'Abbe Arnond (July 19, 1789), in 5 The
Works of Thomas Jefferson 483, 484 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).
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This point might be taken (and has been taken) in its narrow
sense, as a paean to the power of juries to nullify: Trial by jury
allows jurors, acting as representatives of the community, to ensure that a prosecution comports with some communal sense of
justice. When a jury nullifies-i.e., refuses to convict despite the
strength of the evidence-the acquittal not only prevents the
imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant on trial but
also "conveys significant information about community attitudes
and provides a guideline for future prosecutorial discretion in
the enforcement of the laws."'" In this limited sense, criminal
juries give ordinary citizens a voice-albeit solely a veto-in the
execution of the laws. 1°6
So many explorations of the role that juries can or should play

in the enforcement of the law envision a magic moment of nullification-the moment when a jury stares down the prospect of a
fully proven case and self-consciously declines to convict."° But

105
Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1980, at 51, 71. Frank Miller has also noted
that:
To the extent that guilty persons are not charged because of perceived problems in the sufficiency of the evidence to convince the trier of fact of guilt...
[a]lmost invariably the charging pattern is related to a play-back effect of past
trials on similar charges under similar circumstances from which prosecutors
have derived experience enough to realize that to charge would be a futile
gesture ....
Miller, supra note 68, at 43. See also Note, Laws That Are Made To Be Broken:
Adjusting for Anticipated Noncompliance, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 687, 709 (1977) ("When
juries regularly refuse to convict under a particular law, prosecutors are apt to lose
incentive to prosecute under that law, and the law becomes ripe for repeal or may,
under some circumstances, become void."); Rabin, supra note 99, at 1053 ("[T]he
attitudes of judge and jury toward an offense, or a specific violation, are an important
determinant of enforcement policy.").
In the jury deliberations featured in Inside the Jury Room, supra note 43, several
jurors suggested that an acquittal would send a message to the District Attorney's
Office not to bring any more felon-in-possession cases against defendants who posed
no risk to the community.
10,
See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting,
80 Cornell L. Rev. 203 (1995).
117
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale LJ.
1131, 1185-89 (1991); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale LJ.677 (1995); Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking
Jury Nullification, 82 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1996).
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such moments are probably rare, if they happen at all."° Indeed,
the complex of doctrines that so strongly insulates jury acquittals against review is in large part based on the irrebuttable presumption that an alternative explanation for an acquittal can always be found."l As Kalven and Zeisel found in their pioneering
study, "the jury does not often consciously and explicitly yield to
sentiment in the teeth of the law. Rather it yields to sentiment
in the apparent process of resolving doubts as to evidence.' '.
In their "liberation hypothesis," Kalven and Zeisel proposed
that "sentiment gives direction to the resolution of the evidentiary doubt; the evidentiary doubt provides a favorable condition for a response to the sentiment."''. Viewed in this light, the
magic moment of nullification is just an endpoint on a continuum of interplay between proof and "sentiment"-a continuum
in which the burden of proof actually faced by prosecutors
turns, at least in part, on all those factors giving rise to sentiment.' Kalven and Zeisel identified certain factors that can raise
the burden considerably: sympathetic defendants, de minimis
crimes, and unpopular laws."' Other factors presumably will have
the opposite effect: heinous crimes, a defendant perceived as
11,
See Reid Hastie, Introduction, in Inside the Juror, supra note 40, at 29 (finding
"little evidence that jurors depart from the factfinding task to follow the dictates of
conscience or to apply their sense of fair play when deciding criminal trial verdicts");
Dorfman & Iijima, supra note 23, at 893 (noting that a "far more frequent phenomenon" occurs when a "jury nullifies without understanding that it is doing so, through
fictions and surrogates").
10Explaining why jurors could not be punished for daring to acquit the Quakers
William Penn and William Mead, Chief Justice Vaughan reasoned:

A man cannot see by anothers eye, nor hear by anothers ear, no more can a
man conclude or infer the thing to be resolv'd by anothers understanding or
reasoning; and through the verdict be right the jury give, yet they being not
assur'd it is so from their own understanding, are forsworn, at least in foro
conscientiae.
Bushell's Case, 1 Vaughan 135, 148; 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1013 (C.P. 1670). See Peter
Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals

of Criminal Sentences, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1001, 1012-18 (1980).
10
Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 17, at 165.
III Id.

112 See Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 506, 542 (1973) ("[I]t
seems psychologically naive to assume that sufficiency of proof requirements do not
change in the process of decisionmaking.").

113
Kalven

& Zeisel, supra note 17, at 193-350.
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posing a future risk to the community, or one deemed unsympathetic for less legitimate reasons. To put the matter in the terms
profitably suggested by Richard Lempert: Jurors will be acting
to minimize the prospect of personal regret in all cases, and
whatever they learn-whether or not legally "relevant"-relating
to the personal characteristics of victims and defendants, as well

as aspects of criminal activity, will influence their readiness to
convict (or acquit) based on any given quantum of evidence. "
This does not necessarily mean that the more odious the crime,
the more serious the charge, the less protection a defendant can

expect from the judge's instructions about reasonable doubt.
Jurors' assumptions about penalties may in fact make them less
ready to convict for more serious offenses."5 But this interplay
between burden and sentiment does mean, at least, that where

jurors' expectations about penalties are roughly equal,

6

they

114
See Lempert, supra note 17, at 1032-37; see also Reid Hastie, Algebraic Models
of Juror Decision Processes, in Inside the Juror, supra note 40, at 104 (juror's decisional criterion in which "considerations of the satisfaction or utility of the outcome
are paramount").
'See Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their
Verdicts, 13 Law & Soc'y Rev. 781, 794 (1979) (empirical study finds juries more
likely to acquit if offense serious; may "reflect the use of a higher standard of proof
for these crimes"); Norbert Kerr, Stochastic Models of Juror Decision, in Inside the
Juror, supra note 40, at 126-27 ("Attorneys, judges, and legislators believe that as
penalty increases, all other things being equal, jurors will become less likely to
convict." But "[w]hen we turn to the experimental research literature, we find less
consistent support for the hypothesis of penalty effects on verdicts."). Compare
Jonathan L. Freedman et al., Severity of Penalty, Seriousness of the Charge, and
Mock Jurors' Verdicts, 18 Law & Hum. Behav. 189 (1994) (finding no evidence from
mock jury studies that jurors are less likely to convict when offense more serious or
penalty more severe), and Jonathan L. Freedman, Penalties and Verdicts: Keeping
the Record Straight, 18 Law & Hum. Behav. 699 (1994) (attempting to disprove
experimental literature's claims that extreme penalties reduce conviction rates), with
Martin F. Kaplan & Sharon Krupa, Severe Penalties under the Control of Others
Can Reduce Guilt Verdicts, 10 Law & Psych. Rev. 1 (1986) (pointing to empirical
evidence that suggests penalty severity can have an effect on conviction decisions),
and Martin F. Kaplan, Setting the Record Straight (Again) on Severity of Penalty: A
Comment on Freedman et al., 18 Law & Hum. Behav. 697 (1994) (criticizing Freedman
and others as premature in their conclusions about the effect of penalty severity on
jurors).
116
Although trial judges will generally take pains to prevent jurors from speculating
as to the possible sentence in a criminal case, see 1 Edward E. Devitt et al., Federal
Jury Practice and Instructions § 20.01, at 822 (4th ed. 1992) (pattern instruction);
Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury about Mandatory
Sentencing Consequences, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1232, 1242 n. 59 (1995) (citing cases), it
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will convict more readily in cases where they perceive a defendant to pose a greater threat to society and less readily when
they do not. "
Once one recognizes the full extent to which jurors' responses
to defendant, victim, and crime characteristics can influence the

likelihood of conviction, Jefferson's point takes on a far more
sweeping meaning."'

The prosecutor who wants to maximize

her conviction rate, by plea or by trial, must make all her decisions in the shadow of projected jury responses. 19 By doing so,
she gives the community a voice across the whole range of her
case selection decisions. It is not necessarily the strongest of
voices, since considerations of evidentiary strength or numerous
other factors may predominate in the calculus."l Nor is it the
clearest of voices, given the inscrutability of general verdicts.
is fair to assume that "most jurors have at least a general idea of the penalties facing
the accused." Freedman et al., Severity of Penalty, supra note 115, at 201.
17Kerr, supra note 115, at 128-29 ("[A]ny factor which increases the [perceived]
cost of the juridic Type II error, acquitting a guilty defendant, should lower conviction criteria and raise conviction rates."). Anecdotal evidence certainty supports this
hypothesis. Any prosecutor can tell you that, all other things being equal, it is a
whole lot harder to get a conviction in a two-vial crack case than in a 60-kilo cocaine
case, much harder to convict a public official for taking a $500 bribe than for a $1
million payoff.
The documentary Inside the Jury Room, supra note 43, provides an excellent
example of the interplay between sentiment and proof in a felon-in-possession case.
Faced with an extremely sympathetic defendant, several jurors were quite creative in
constructing theories about why someone whose lawyer had conceded possession in
his opening really had not possessed a gun at all.
I's As de Tocqueville put it: "The jury system as understood in America seems to me
as direct and extreme a consequence of the ... sovereignty of the people as universal
suffrage. They are both equally powerful means of making the majority prevail ......
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 273 (Jacob P. Mayer ed., 1969).
1See
Milton Huemann, Plea Bargaining (1978); Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909 (1992).
To the extent that a prosecutor is dubious about her chances of success before a
jury but counts on defense counsel's inability to appreciate these odds, she may
persevere with charges in hopes of obtaining a guilty plea. See Leipold, supra note
107, at 301. In the absence of information about who counsel will be, or of a universe
of potential counsel that reliably can be presumed ineffective, such risk taking will
presumably be rare. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on
the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 630, 640-51 (1979).
11The strength of the voice may also be reduced by a sentencing scheme that
inflicts so great a penalty on defendants convicted after trial that only those highly
confident of acquittal will take the risk.
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And it is not a voice finely calibrated to differentiate among all
cases. Yet through it, the community has a far greater say in
how prosecutors deploy their resources than it has through any
more direct mechanism of political accountability."'
Any suggestion that verdicts represent some general commu-

nity voice is open to the challenge that juries simply do not possess this representative quality-a challenge that those questioning the legitimacy of nullification articulate most clearly.1"
In our fragmented society, we can no longer speak of a single

community, the argument goes." Even if we could, the randomness of petit jury selection does not ensure that this community will be recreated for a trial."4 Even were that possible,
any claim to representation in the jury pool would be confounded by peremptory strikes and other tactics that parties use
to rig jury membership.

This critique casts serious doubt on any claim that, viewed ex
post, a particular jury verdict represents some general communal judgment. Ex ante, however, the prosecutor making resource deployment decisions with an eye to maximizing convic- Whether projected verdicts affect prosecutorial decisionmaking consciously or
through reinforcement will doubtless vary from case to case, but the effects can be
identical. See Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences 82-83 (1989) (distinguishing rational choice from reinforcement).
For all this, however, the Department of Justice's "Principles of Federal Prosecution" doggedly declare: "The potential that-despite the law and the facts that create
a sound, prosecutable case-the fact-finder is likely to acquit the defendant because
of the unpopularity of some factor involved in the prosecution or because of the
overwhelming popularity of the defendant or his/her cause, is not a factor prohibiting
prosecution." United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-27.220, cmt. (1993).
1- See Leipold, supra note 107, at 299-301; Phillip B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An
Historical Perspective on a Modem Debate, 91 W. Va. L. Rev. 389, 422 (1989);
Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury 89 (1994); Steven M. Warshawsky, Note, Opposing
Jury Nullification: Law, Policy, and Prosecutorial Strategy, 85 Geo. L.I. 191, 218-19
(1996). But see Dorfman & Iijima, supra note 23, at 901 (giving juries an explicit
authorization to nullify "would inject more democracy into the justice system, rather
than usurp its influence, and would serve as a direct reminder from the bench that
one of the purposes of the jury is to reflect community values").
2 See William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of
Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830, at 165-66, 174 (1975).
14 But see Abrams, supra note 74, at 1432 n.120 ("[T]he process of jury selectionin its goal of producing a 'cross-section' of the community-comes closer [than elections] to the understanding that a community's views are not unitary but multiple and
conflicting.").
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tions, unaware of future petit jury composition, will consider the
predicted reaction of a far more representative jury than will
ever actually be impaneled. This will not be true where a group
is systematically excluded from juries. Even defenders of jury
nullification are forced to admit" that the ugly side of the relationship between juries, verdicts, and prosecutorial discretion is
a history of racist justice." But where a jury pool is indeed representative, the conviction-maximizing prosecutor will, in her
discretionary decisions, pay as much heed to minority viewpoints
under the present scheme as she would in a system of representative racial quotas on trial juries.1" From this ex ante perspective, the mere possibility of a jury trial can bring an often overlooked degree of accountability into our system of essentially
administrative justice.
B. Verdicts and Evidentiary Rules

There is a Newtonian neatness to the model I have just outlined. It even has some normative appeal-not as a self-contained vision of justice, since one can hardly justify a majoritar12 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 107, at 680 n.11, 705; Dorfman & Iijima, supra note
23, at 903.
126See Abramson, supra note 122, at 61-62; Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G.
Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev.
867, 890-91 (1994); Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A
Skeptical View, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 488, 514 (1976) ("[B]y activating local biases, jury
nullification may at times in effect immunize criminal acts visited upon members of
society's 'discrete and insular minorities' .... ").
I do not mean to suggest that prosecutors who charged blacks with serious crimes
under circumstances in which they would have brought lesser charges (or no charges
at all) against whites did so simply in response to their expectations of jury sentiments. But prosecutorial and jury biases certainly can reinforce one another, with
racial considerations entering into assessments of "evidentiary strength." See Martha
A. Myers & John Hagan, Private and Public Trouble: Prosecutors and the Allocation
of Court Resources, 26 Soc. Probs. 439 (1979).
'1 For discussions of the merits of racial quotas for petit juries, see, e.g., Albert W.
Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 Duke LJ. 704 (1995); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1611, 1698-99 (1985); Andrew
G. Deiss, Negotiating Justice: The Criminal Trial Jury in a Pluralist America, 3 U.
Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 323, 353-54 (1996); see also Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury
Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 707, 767-75 (1993) (disapproving of racial quotas in the
jurybox, but favoring some front-end race-conscious selection process).
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ian system that makes the government's burden of proof turn on
a defendant's jury appeal or his victim's lack thereof.1" But the
model highlights how the community's voice can be heard even
in a system where prosecutorial discretion is virtually unchallengeable and most cases never make it to trial.
The tension between justice and accountability is heightened
once one takes a step from potentiality toward reality and introduces evidentiary doctrine into the mix. Critical to the notion of
jury verdicts as guides to the kinds of cases the public wants
pursued is the assumption that jurors know all the facts that
they would find salient in a case. Yet our system of exclusionary
rules of evidence frequently ensures that this will not happen."
This point is most dramatically illustrated when a trial judge
bars a defendant from presenting evidence and arguments that

explicitly court nullification."3 The phenomenon has far broader
dimensions as well: Every evidentiary rule that-for fear of jury
misvaluation, "inflammation," or nullification-prevents the
jury from learning something about a criminal defendant, his
victim, or his crime tends to rob verdicts of the power to communicate the community's actual prosecutorial priorities."'
118
See Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev.
168, 215 (1972) ("For the jury to convict against the law as it has been announced to
them is tantamount to finding the defendant guilty of a crime when in fact his act may
not have been criminal but for the retroactive application of a new principle.").
129
See Leipold, supra note 107, at 303 (defenders of nullification assume that jurors
have enough information to make reasoned decision).
128See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733, 736-38 (11th Cir. 1985)
(trespassers at nuclear facility barred from explaining implications of nuclear power
and nuclear weapons); see also Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion In Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: Silencing the Defendant at Trial, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1271, 132227 (1987) (condemning in limine rulings that precluded defendants from raising
political defenses that would lead jurors to judge the law as well as the facts in
politically sensitive cases); Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note, Jury Nullification and Jury
Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 825, 857-65 (1990) (giving other examples);
Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification": When May and Should a Jury
Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 239, 250 (1993) ("Limiting
defense evidence on the grounds that it is irrelevant to a particular legal theory and
may therefore prompt nullification is a dubious route."); Warshawsky, supra note
122, at 228-31 (highlighting a prosecutor's need to be aware of the potential for jury
nullification).
31
In jurisdictions where there is jury sentencing across a broad range of crimesnot merely in capital cases-sentences can take the place of verdicts in this regard.
See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the

1997]

ProsecutorialAccountability

This is not to say that every exclusionary rule threatens prosecutorial accountability. Particularly gruesome or gory pictures
are often kept from juries in murder trials, for fear that they will
"arouse the passions and prejudices of the jury."" Yet it is far
from clear that the public would attach much importance to
these pictures in allocating prosecutorial resources.133 A bloody
murder scene might indicate a particular depravity on the part
of the murderer, or the extraordinary brutality of the crime, but
not necessarily so. In any event, even if the community did respond to the aesthetics of a murder scene-or to the luridness of
tabloid coverage, which in turn reflected the aesthetics of the
scene-this would be an instance (not necessarily unique) where
some insulation of prosecutors from popular sentiments would
be acceptable to all."
Where a community response does bespeak at least an arguably well-considered reaction to social harms, however, the costs of
an evidentiary doctrine that prevents jury verdicts from reflecting such a response are more troubling. Evidentiary doctrine,
for instance, quite correctly fears that a jury will be quicker to
convict, or will at least have fewer regrets about convicting,
when it learns of a defendant's prior criminal record. 35 But such
reactions find their roots in a sensible belief that recidivists pose
a greater danger to the community, and, by extension, should be
a prosecutorial priority." A rule, like that prevailing in most jurisdictions, that generally keeps juries from learning about a defendant's prior record thus can operate to make the purely con-

Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 547, 595 n.272 (1997) (collecting state
statutory
citations).
3
Ritchie v. State, 632 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Okla. Crim. 1981). See also State v.
Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1215-17 (Ariz. 1983); State v. Wilson, 310 S.E.2d 486, 487-88
(W. Va. 1983).
Where homicides are concerned, the issue is generally more the degree of prose-

cutorial effort than whether or not charges will be brought at all.

ImSee Abrams, supra note 74, at 1423 ("[T]oo much emphasis on the vicissitudes of

community opinion as compared with the more enduring interests thought to be embodied in criminal law, may detract from the legitimacy of the prosecutor's efforts.").
13See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
16 See Brian Forst & Kathleen B. Brosi, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of
the Prosecutor, 6 J. Legal Stud. 177, 179 (1977) (prosecutors likely to reduce overall
crime by focusing on recidivists).
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viction-minded prosecutor more concerned with offense 3seri7
ousness and evidentiary strength than with criminal history.
Ironically, in the one setting where we most desire to erase
the differences between cases, in order to foster a disjunction
between popular sentiment and prosecutorial. priorities, we cannot. If "minority defendants-because of their own race or the
race of their victim, [do indeed] receive disproportionately
harsher treatment at each stage of the prosecutorial decision-

making process,"1 the pattern might simply indicate conscious
or unconscious racism on the part of the prosecutorial decisionmakers. Yet it could also reflect, or be reinforced by, projected jury responses in such cases. Even a prosecutor harboring no such personal biases will perpetuate the pattern to the

extent that she endeavors to maximize convictions and perceives
jurors as more likely to convict minority defendants generally,

137

Id. at 190-91 (empirical study of 1973 felony arrests in District of Columbia
cannot find correlation between defendants' criminal records and the extent of
prosecutorial attention to a case; such attention far more sensitive to offense seriousness and strength of evidence). During the period of this study, as now, a
defendant's prior convictions were generally not admissible, except to impeach his
testimony or prove motive, intent, etc., subject to a balancing test. See Drew v.
United States, 331 F.2d 85, 89-90 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The trend toward establishing
special units for prosecuting repeat offenders, see Marcia Chaiken & Jan Chaiken,
Redefining the Career Criminal: Priority Prosecution of High-Rate Dangerous
Offenders (N.IJ. 1990), may well counterbalance what otherwise would be an insufficient focus on this group. Increased sentences for recidivists would have a similar
effect, to the extent that prosecutors maximized sentence-years.
118
Developments In the Law, Race and the Criminal Process, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1472, 1525 (1988). For a discussion of some of the empirical evidence suggesting such
a pattern, see id. at 1525-32; William Bowers et al., Legal Homicide: Death as
Punishment in America, 1864-1982, at 67-103 (1980); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey
v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388
(1988); Gary D. LaFree, The Effect of Sexual Stratification by Race on Official
Reactions to Rape, 45 Am. Soc. Rev. 842, 852-53 (1980); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn
L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 Law & Soc'y
Rev. 587 (1985); Cassia Spohn et al., The Impact of Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 Criminology 175
(1987); see also Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States, in 21 Ethnicity, Crime, and
Immigration: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives 311 (Michael Tonry ed.,
1997) (reviewing empirical literature and finding no clear pattern of discriminatory
enforcement).
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or those with non-minority victims.39 Regrettably, information
about the race of a defendant or victim is not amendable to manipulation through exclusionary rules of evidence.
Nothing here need be taken as an argument for doing away
with, or even relaxing, evidentiary rules like those restricting the
introduction of prior convictions." Although reasonable minds
might differ, the fairness and fact-finding accuracy values that
those rules promote far outweigh (to me, at least) the interests
of prosecutorial accountability served by exposing juries to this
information. Whether viewed as a "truth-seeking process" or a
"drama" from which the public "assimilates behavioral messages,''. the primary purpose of a criminal trial must be to ascertain the blameworthiness of the defendant for the charged
offense, not to make some general assessment of his moral deserts or threat to the community.' 2 Nonetheless, we should recognize the potential costs of these and other exclusionary evidentiary doctrines that rob verdicts of the power to communicate
the community's prosecutorial preferences, and leave prosecutors freer to exercise virtually unaccountable discretion. These
costs are even more troubling to the extent that jurors, deprived
of accurate information about, say, a defendant's or victim's
background, speculate on such matters based on stereotypes.

-Empirical studies continue to suggest the existence of such bias among juries.
See Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a
Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1,
110-15 (1990) (reviewing empirical evidence suggesting that all-white juries are more
prone to convict black defendants than to convict white defendants). But see Sampson

& Lauritsen, supra note 138, at 346 (finding "no consistent evidence that minorities
are disadvantaged at the stage of criminal conviction").
110
Those who would radically change these long-accepted limitations do not need
my help. See Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General on the Admis-

sion of Criminal Histories at Trial, 22 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 707 (1989) (arguing
against any such restrictions); see also Fed. R. Evid. 413-415 (relaxing restrictions in
sex offense and child abuse cases).
'4' Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Accept-

ability of Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 1360 (1985).
"' The same rationale also counsels against relaxing rules restricting a defendant's
ability to show that he has been a good person in the past. See Fed. R. Evid. 404-405

(criminal defendant restricted to calling opinion or reputation witnesses to show a
"pertinent" character trait; evidence of specific past good deeds barred).
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III. THE RULE IN OLD CHIEFAND
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

Recognizing the tendency of evidentiary rules to drive a

wedge between prosecutors and the communities they serve is
one thing. Determining whether such rules actually carry these
costs is quite another, demanding an inquiry into what makes
prosecutors tick. Because it endeavors (however vainly) to preclude verdicts from being influenced by the single factor that
most citizens would consider first in judging the appropriateness
of a great many § 922(g)(1) prosecutions, Old Chiefprovides an

excellent vehicle for asking this question.
When it comes to felon-in-possession cases, the storied discretion of federal prosecutors is at its zenith. A huge number of
convicted felons have guns, 43 and the only real issue of proof at

trial is possession." Moreover, the range of criminal "conduct"
is about as broad as that covered by any federal statute: from
the convicted murderer carrying a weapon under circumstances

suggesting his interest in using it for another murder to our retired lobsterman-felon who wants some protection in his old age
(but has failed to procure the requisite waiver).

5

That federal prosecutors will bring a sizable number of
§ 922(g)(1) cases is virtually certain. One of few areas of com1'Under California's 15-day waiting-period scheme, of 500,000 requests for
handgun purchases in 1991, 3,000 rejected purchasers had a prior assault record, and
34 rejected purchasers had a homicide record. Erik Eckholm, Thorny Issue in Gun
Control: Curbing Responsible Owners, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1992, at Al, A15. According to an ATF survey of the Brady Bill's effects, of 441,545 applications for
handgun purchases from Feb. 1994 to Feb. 1995, 4,365 people were rejected because
they had felony records. James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Keeping Guns Out
of the "Wrong" Hands: The Brady Law and the Limits of Regulation, 86 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 93, 102-03 (1995). Because many felons aware of legal barriers to
their ownership of a gun are not likely to file a formal application for purchase and
can easily buy guns in the largely unrelated secondary market, see Philip J. Cook,
Stephanie Molliconi & Thomas B. Cole, Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 59 (1995), these figures only hint at what must be a rather large number
people violating § 922(g). See also James D. Wright & Peter H. Rossi, Armed and
Considered Dangerous: A Survey of Felons and Their Firearms 16 (1986) (in sample
of 1,874 incarcerated felons, only 21% had obtained their most recent handgun from
a customary retail outlet; 44% had obtained it from friends or family, and 26% from
gray and black market sources).
" See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
14 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (setting out waiver procedures).
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mon ground in the often bitter gun control debate is a consensus
that the felon-in-possession law should be vigorously enforced."
But on what basis will prosecutors select among the vast universe of potential defendants cases?14 Chance will play a significant role. When local police respond to a "man with a gun"
call and find that the suspect has a prior felony, they might well
hand him over for a quick federal prosecution.' But beyond
that, will the Justice Department focus on the armed felons who
pose a real danger to the community, or will any armed felon
do? Doubtless, many people have decided views on the matter,

views that turn on a defendant's background, as revealed by the
nature of his prior felony. That was the justifiable assumption
of the Court in Old Chief, and all the lower courts that considered the issue presented therein.149 But so long as a defendant
can preclude juries from learning the nature of his prior felony,
the prosecutor interested solely in maximizing convictions"5 will
146See Randy E. Barnett & Dan B. Kates, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the
Second Amendment, 45 Emory L.J. 1139, 1235 (1996) (" [For seventy-five years gun
groups have insisted on, supported, and actually drafted laws against handgun possession by felons, 'use-a-gun, go-to-jail' laws, ever-harsher penalties for gun possession
by felons, gun misuse, and 'three-strike' laws.").
147 Between October 1, 1994 and April 30, 1996, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms referred 5,512 cases for prosecution under § 922(g). This statistic does
not separate out cases under § 922(g)(1). Letter from Robert L. Pritchett, Chief,
Disclosure Branch, ATF (July 5, 1996) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). In fiscal year 1995, United States Attorneys Offices prosecuted 5,327 defendants as part of "Project Triggerlock," see infra notes 159-163 and accompanying text,
a figure that does not distinguish between charges under § 922(g)(1) and those under
other firearms statutes. Sourcebook, supra note 9, at 450 tbl.5.5.
-,See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325, 1330 (1st Cir. 1994); United States
v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 98-99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 927 (1993). The head of
the Justice Department's Criminal Division noted that:
[T]he most common way that we come across a 922(g) violation is when the
person has committed another crime. It is difficult for law enforcement to
learn about and be able to prosecute a 922(g) without their having committed
another crime because it is very difficult to find them in possession ....
Prosecution of Federal Gun Crimes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and
Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong. 49 (1994) (hereinafter
Prosecution of Federal Gun Crimes).
419
See supra note 3.
110See, e.g., Standen, supra note 70, at 1496 n.83 ("In most cases.., the prosecutor's alleged immediate concern is with maximizing the value of his services, usually
expressed in terms of wins and losses, both to himself and to his employers, and he
will examine the desirability of offering particular plea bargains from this rather
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have no basis for distinguishing among cases. At least that will
be true if jurors do not speculate on the basis of stereotypes. If
they do, and if the prosecutor presumes they do, the result will
be worse because even the racially blind conviction-maximizing
prosecutor will find himself disproportionately using § 922(g)(1)
against young black men, exacerbating one of the worst tendencies of our criminal justice system. 5 ' The most unfair aspects of
this scenario would be cured if Old Chief were applied asym-

metrically, giving defendants who fear stereotyping the option
of communicating their actual criminal records to juries. However, not even this reading of Old Chief would eliminate its adverse distributional effects. While all defendants with "serious"

felonies would volunteer stipulations, only those who did not fit
juror stereotypes of dangerousness would appreciably reduce

their chances of conviction though this tactic.
Even if we sharpened our model to assume that prosecutors
seek to maximize convictions weighted by sentence," as opposed to just number of convictions, the potential problem remains. Congress failed to structure § 922(g)(1)'s penalties to fa-

vor prosecution of felons with the most serious criminal convictions,"' and ithas established a sentencing guidelines system that
narrow perspective."); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. Legal. Stud. 43, 50-53 (1988).
5 See Jerome G. Miller, Search and Destroy: African-American Males in the Criminal Justice System (1996); Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in America (1995); Joseph F. Sheley, Structural Influences on the Problem of
Race, Crime, and Criminal Justice Discrimination, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2273 (1993). But
see Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1255, 1255-1260 (1994) (noting "overheated allegations of
racism" and arguing that main problem confronting black communities is not excessive
policing and invidious punishment but failure of state to deploy law enforcement
resources evenhandedly); cf. Sampson & Lauritsen, supra note 138, at 362-63 (reporting
that the majority of persons in state and federal prisons are black, and that the
incarceration rate of black males is currently seven times the rate for white males,
and noting that "[w]ith such enormous disproportionality in sanctioning, it should be
of little comfort that most of the disparity is a result of differential involvement in
nondrug criminal offending").
"12See William Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & Econ. 61, 63
(1971); Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 295-96.
113Congress could have retained the current form of § 922(g)(1), but graded
§ 922(g)(1) offenses according to the nature of a defendant's prior felony. Analogy
might be made to the narcotics distribution statutes, in which drug quantity is not an
element of the offense, see United States v. Campuzano, 905 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 947 (1990); United States v. Brown, 887 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir.
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substantially limits the ability of defense counsel to extract sentencing discounts from prosecutors for sympathetic defendants.'"
Indeed, even if the rule in Old Chief were applied asymmetrically, to allow defendants with relatively innocuous prior felonies to communicate that fact to juries, its benefit to them would
frequently be limited to the increased probability of acquittal at

trial-a benefit that might be outweighed by the loss of the discount generally given under the55 Federal Sentencing Guidelines
to defendants who plead guilty.

The doctrinal areas vary--crime definition, evidentiary rules,
sentencing schemes-but one constant emerges: At every point
where invisible-hand mechanisms might have been used to ensure prosecutorial accountability or otherwise align prosecutorial choices with community preferences in low-visibility deci1989), but is taken into account both in mandatory minimums, 21 U.S.C. § 841, and in
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (1996). See H.R. Rep. No. 99845, pt.1, at 11 (1986) (creation of five- and ten-year mandatory minimum drug
sentences would create incentives for Department of Justice to focus on the most
serious drug traffickers). The Sentencing Guidelines are similarly neutral, since the
base offense level will be the same for most § 922(g)(1) violations, and criminal
history points generally do not turn on the nature of a defendant's prior record.
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 (1996). Congress has graded § 922(g)(1) only in extreme cases. See
§ 924(e)(1) (15-year mandatory minimum for § 922(g)(1) defendant with three
previous convictions for "a violent felony or serious drug offense, or both").
1'4The precise degree to which the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have limited
prosecutorial flexibility in this regard is a matter of controversy. Compare Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is Uniformity,
Not Disparity, 29 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 833, 845 (1992) (estimating that Guidelines
manipulation occurs in "twenty to thirty-five percent" of all guilty plea cases), Ilene
H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of
Charging and Bargaining Practices under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 501, 547-49 (1992) (discussing different types of plea bargaining), and
John Gleeson, Sentencing Bargaining Under the Guidelines, 8 Fed. Sentencing Rep.
314, 317 (1996) (survey conducted by Probation Officers Advisory Group finds that
prosecutors "manipulate"' facts to "protect"' plea agreements), with Frank 0. Bowman III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning
to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 679, 728-30 (taking
issue with Schulhofer's estimate). That the Guidelines substantially ended the ability
of parties and/or judges to tailor sentences to a defendant's individual circumstances
is not in dispute.
-See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (two-level adjustment for "acceptance of responsibility");
U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Report on the
Operation of the Guidelines System and Short-Term Impacts on Disparity in Sentencing, Use of Incarceration, and Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining
77-81 (1991) (defendants who plead guilty likely to receive higher sentences under
Guidelines).
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sionmaking, Congress or the courts have, for various reasons,
chosen not to use them. This tendency, not at all unique to the
§ 922(g)(1) context, presents two fundamental questions. The
first is whether, in the absence of such formal mechanisms, there
is a systematic disjunction between prosecutorial and community priorities. If there is, reconsideration of these choices might
be appropriate. The answers to this question are bound to be

impressionistic, even anecdotal. Yet there is reason to believe
that federal prosecutors do try to distinguish between the "hard-

ened criminal," whose access to a gun threatens grave harms,
and the retired lobsterman."56 Indeed, in a recent congressional
hearing, the head of the Criminal Division pointedly assertedcontrary to one congressman's suggestion-that the prosecution
of every § 922(g)(1) brought to the Justice Department's attention would simply not be "good law enforcement policy."'" And
studies of local and federal offices regularly suggest a decent degree of congruence between prosecutorial priorities and community
preferences, or at least an effort to achieve such congru56
ence.
The second question is more interesting, and even harder. If

there is no such disjunction, why isn't there one? The insights
156In his study of "matters" received by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern
District of Illinois in 1973-74, Richard Frase found that the prosecution rate for
weapons and explosives offenses was 24%. Frase, supra note 99, at 258. In 47% of
the cases declined, one reason that the screening prosecutor gave for declining the
case was that it involved a "minor" offense. Id. at 269. Frase noted, as a general
matter: "Trivial cases are not declined for lack of manpower, but because a policy
decision has been made that these cases do not require criminal prosecution, at least
in federal court." Id. at 281. In 1993, U.S. Attorneys' Offices declined to prosecute
27.6% of the weapons defendants referred to them-a figure slightly lower than the
30.9% overall rate. Sourcebook, supra note 9, at 465 tbl.5.16. Although declination
statistics may merely reflect agency referral practices, these figures are at least
consistent with a story of prosecutorial selectivity.
117 Prosecution of Federal Gun Crimes, supra note 148, at 50 (testimony of Jo Ann
Harris, Ass't Atty. Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
"'See Eisenstein, supra note 60, at 202-05; Scheingold, supra note 85, at 160
(finding that prosecutors in local jurisdiction studied "believed in a kind of contextual
accountability that afforded protection against losing touch with the basic values and
changing priorities of the public that they served"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal
Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289, 302 (1983) ("[A]n examination
of the cases prosecutors do and do not file suggests that decisions appear to be reasoned, responsible, and consistent with public perceptions of the gravity of different
offenses ....).
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we can gain from provisionally assuming that the system largely
works in this regard may be at least as illuminating as those we
get by presuming the opposite on the basis of the same sort of
sketchy evidence. One partial answer in the § 922(g)(1) context

is that the federal government recently made a concerted effort
to change the selection of defendants from a low to a high visibil-

ity decision. In April 1991, with much fanfare, Attorney General Thornburgh announced "Project Triggerlock," which would
use federal firearms statutes to "'protect the public by putting
the most dangerous offenders in prison for as long as the law
allows."" 59 In August 1992, in coordination with "Triggerlock,"
the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

announced "Operation Achilles Heel," which targeted over 600
"of this nation's most violent criminals" for federal firearms
charges.'" In doing so, the Director highlighted the nature of
the targets' prior felony convictions: "murder, rape,61 crimes
against children, aggravated assault, robbery, and so on.',
Perhaps these programmatic initiatives were, at least in part,

an effort by the Bush Administration to blunt criticism for its
opposition to the Brady Bill.62 But, even if they were, they show

-Tracy Thompson, Gun Crimes Targeted by Prosecutors; National Effort Seen as
Partly Political, Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 1991, at A14 (quoting Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh). See also Christopher Kilbourne, Police Add Ammunition against Gunmen: Cooperation Among Federal, State, Local Cops, The Record (Bergen), Apr. 11,
1991, at A3; U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York Report for 1991,
at 3 (1992) (noting how, as part of "Operation Triggerlock," the U.S. Attorney's
Office developed a "close relationship" with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms and "worked closely" with the New York City Police and Housing Police
"to address the gun epidemic through selective application of justifiably harsh federal
penalties to repeat offenders carrying guns, illegal gun dealers, and those using guns
in the course of drug crimes and crimes of violence").
A follow-up memorandum by the head of the Criminal Division of the Justice
Department to United States attorneys suggested that they screen "all state and local
arrests within [their] district of felons.., who were in possession of a firearm at the
time of their arrest." Norman Abrams & Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Law and
Its Enforcement 89-90 (1993).
110
Press Conference of Stephen E. Higgins, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms (Aug. 22, 1991) (Federal News Service transcript).
Id.

161

1 Thornburgh Orders Drive on Gun Violence, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1991, at A20
(When "pressed by reporters," Justice Department official denies that "Triggerlock"
"was an effort to blunt mounting support in Congress for legislation controlling the
sale of handguns. One such measure would prohibit dealers from delivering firearms
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how the Executive Branch can make its adherence to popular

prosecutorial priorities into a political asset. The Executive
Branch's efforts in this regard have continued during the Clinton Administration.63 The benefits of such a pre-commitment
to community priorities (even where juries are unaware of the
congruence) may also helps explain the prevalence of "career
offender" programs in local prosecutors' offices."
There are limits, however, to how many low visibility deci-

sions can be transformed into high visibility decisions for political gain. And there are similar limits to the number and type of
cases at the other extreme-those in which a defense lawyer

courting sympathetic publicity for her client (and maybe coincidentally for herself) can make a prosecution into a political liability.165 Our retired lobsterman is probably safe after all (at

least in Maine or Massachusetts). But what about the less pathetic cases? Perhaps a prosecutor will target offenders posing
the greatest danger to the community, for fear of political fallout

if they committed more serious crimes in the future.1" The risk
of such fallout, however, will turn on whether a causal link can
be drawn between the prosecutor's discretionary decisionmakto purchasers for a week, pending a police background check. The Bush Administration opposes the bill.").
6 The Department of Justice continues to separate out "Project Triggerlock" cases
when reporting case filing statistics. See Sourcebook, supra note 9, at 450, tbl. 5.5.
164See supra note 137 and accompanying text; see also Victor Navasky & Darrell
Paster, Law Enforcement: The Federal Role 65 (1976) (recounting how in 1975, "the
President and the Attorney General both took time off from their other duties to
pose for pictures" with local prosecutors who had come to receive federal grant money
in connection with the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's Career
Criminal program).
6
11 Miller, supra note 68, at 343 ("One of the ways in which interested persons,
whether they be private citizens, judges, or police officials, sometimes influence charging practices is to enlist the aid of the publicity media.").
6 See Standen, supra note 70, at 1499 n.98 ("It is possible for the prosecutor to
internalize societal interests in plea settlements if the prosecutor suffers the harms
from leniency directly.").
The political costs of a case where a nexus is perceived between official leniency or
inaction and a subsequent crime were dramatically demonstrated in New York City
recently, when a domestic violence defendant, released on bail after being charged
with a misdemeanor, killed his ex-girlfriend. See Mayor Presses Ouster of Abuse
Case Judge, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1996, at 29; Joseph P. Fried, Duckman Is Returning,
but to Civil Court, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1996, at B1; Jim Dwyer, Free to Kill as DA
Dallied, Daily News (New York), May 21, 1996, at 4; Maureen Fan, DA Had Role in
Judge's Deadly Error, Daily News (New York), May 26, 1997, at 18.
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ing and the offenders' presence in the community. And the risk
that such a link will be drawn is generally low for federal prosecutors, since state or local authorities are traditionally held responsible for crime, particularly violent crime, within their territorial jurisdiction.
Speculation on the calculus that drives selection of § 922(g)(1)
defendants cannot be separated from speculation on prosecutorial motivation more generally. Even assuming that direct political pressures on prosecutorial offices are felt down in the
trenches, they surely do not figure in most of the decisions that
line prosecutors make from day to day. In the absence of potential jury input or media headlines, what other forces might make
these prosecutors good (or bad) agents of their communities in
the deployment of resources? For all the efforts to model or
regulate prosecutorial behavior, so much more inquiry needs to
be done into professional ideologies, role conceptions, and economic self-interest (both short-term and long-term)67 before we
can begin to answer this question satisfactorily." As a former
federal prosecutor,69' I am tempted to suggest that prosecutors
167

See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Game Theoretic and Contractarian Paradigms in
the Uneasy Relationship between Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 Fordham
L. Rev. 149, 168-70 (1996) (reputational interests of agency lawyers influence agency
behavior).
16Without sustained inquiry in this regard, the value of Tracey Meares's provocative proposal to reform charging practices by offering prosecutors relatively small
financial incentives cannot possibly be assessed. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for
Good Behavior. Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial
Incentives, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 851 (1995). A great many prosecutors have already
forgone immediate financial rewards, perhaps because they prefer to invest in litigation skills, professional reputation, or political capital, or because of the personal
satisfaction they derive from the work. The extent to which their behavior can be
altered through cash payments will turn on the strength of these diverse preferences
and the consistency of such preferences with the goals that payors seek to promote.
For example, a scheme using small payments to deter prosecutorial misconduct during
trial, for example, see id. at 902-07, may be of no avail if the most rabid prosecutors
enjoy the greatest success in attracting business once they become defense lawyers.
See Weaver, supra note 69, at 40-41 (while younger lawyers in Antitrust Division
"prefer more money to less money," what they want most "is the experience and
skills they think they will need to recommend them in their future careers"; most
intend to leave "well before the time they would become eligible for the pay and
responsibility" of Division's "most senior lawyers").
10 Between 1987 and 1992, 1 was an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern
District of New York.
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just happen to be a superior breed of public servant. Yet I will
resist and simply say that behavior models based on conviction
(or sentence-year) maximization are unacceptably simplistic.'
As in any bureaucratic organization, office ideology surely is
an important, but as yet underexplored, factor in prosecutorial
behavior."' The esprit of a group that celebrates its mission of
"getting bad guys" may make the unsuccessful prosecution of a
"worthy" target (however defined) preferable to the easy case
against the relatively harmless defendant. Of course, what a prosecutor might describe as a commitment to doing the "right thing"
has also been called a dangerous sanctimoniousness. But however this ideology is described (and descriptions will differ from
office to office), the point here is that it surely will have important (and probably salutary) effects on case-selection decisions.
Neither should the inquiry stop at internal organizational factors. Prosecutors may not be a "breed" of public servant after
all, at least not in the bigger offices in this country-the offices
in cities offering the broadest range of discretionary enforcement decisions, and future job opportunities. They are just lawyers, participating, to varying extents, in an occupational culture
that transcends their role in the criminal justice system." To
170

All efforts to model behavior will inevitably be somewhat reductionist.

See

Robinson, supra note 69, at 85 ("Attempts to model bureaucratic behavior along
rationalistic lines do not necessarily deny that individuals have complex and multifaceted utility functions, but they hypothesize that, in the bureaucratic environment,
individual preferences converge on a singular utility maximand."). My point is that
the oft-used prosecutorial behavior model is unacceptably so.
171 See Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, 243-44 (1967) ("Each bureau develops
its ideology gradually through the investment of time and effort by its top leaders.
This ideology is used to build up external support and internal cohesion among people
who agree with its mission and activities as expressed in its ideology.").
I72See James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why
They Do It 60 (1989) ("In a bureaucracy, professionals are those employees who

receive some significant portion of their incentives from organized groups of fellow

practitioners located outside the agency."); Downs, supra note 171, at 95-96 ("[S]ome
analysts of bureaus consider professionals as a separate bureaucratic type because
each is more strongly influenced by his occupation than his organization ....
"); see

also Eisenstein, supra note 60, at 161 (Prosecutors "who regard themselves as
'officers of the court' and adhere to a 'due process' model rely more on their own
legal judgments and less on the attitudes of agents."); Grosman, supra note 93, at 68
(While some prosecutors identify with the police and associate defense lawyers with
their clients, "[o]thers identify with the values of the defense lawyers and accord
these values some prestige. This is reflected in the prosecutor's own self-conception,
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what extent do prosecutors adhere to the norms of this occupational culture?1" And to what degree do norms about who "deserves" to be prosecuted reflect community preferences on such
matters? These are only a few of the questions that a proper inquiry into prosecutorial accountability needs to explore.
In the end, like Richard Fenno's members of Congress, each
prosecutor surely has her "own mix of priorities and intensities-a mix which may, of course, change over time."174 But it
would be helpful to have a working model of prosecutorial behavior-a model that will bring together such diverse factors as
ideological self-selection, the constraints of office and courtroom, as well as long and short-term economic incentives. We
are quite far from that.
CONCLUSION

How much do rules of evidence restricting the information
that jurors receive about defendants, victims, and crimes matter
in the criminal justice system? Certainly they will influence the
verdicts in particular trials; that at least has been the assumption
of the rulemakers. But trials happen so rarely. Do the rules
have appreciable effects on all the other cases, the ones that
never make it to trial? If they do, by affecting the case-selection
decisions by prosecutors seeking to maximize convictions, such
rules threaten to create a disjunction between prosecutors' priorities and those of the communities they serve. This point
need not been taken as an argument against the rules, since any
costs in prosecutorial accountability must be weighed against
the gains in verdict fairness and accuracy. The prospect of these
systemic costs must be recognized, however. And, to the extent
one of being clearly a part of the general legal community, and in his interaction with
defense lawyers."); cf. Frase, supra note, 94, at 563-64 (comparing careerism of
French prosecutors with revolving door practices in the United States).
113 As Suzanne Weaver has noted:
[T]he close connections that [Antitrust Division lawyers, at all levels] maintain
with their colleagues in the private antitrust bar ... provide a publicity that to a
large extent compensates for a lack of detailed attention by the general public

and that [division lawyers] regard as a powerful constraint on their actions.
Weaver, supra note 69, at 160-61.
174Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees 1 (1973).
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they occur, these will be the costs of the rule that Old Chief has
promulgated for felon-in-possession cases.
In short, if prosecutors' primary criteria for selecting cases is
likelihood of conviction and/or length of sentence, Old Chiefis a
troubling decision, threatening a regime of prosecution by
stereotype. If it does not trouble us-and I don't believe it
should-Old Chief challenges us to pursue the mysteries of
prosecutorial motivation. The need to maximize convictions
will inevitably influence how prosecutors behave, whether
elected or appointed. It is not the only influence, however, and
it may not even be the most important one.

